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Abstract
Modern software systems have become increasingly complex and they are
used to perform vital functions in todays society. It is therefore crucial that
software systems are as free of errors as possible. A software system is
usually divided up into communicating components and there are restric-
tions on how the components can communicate. This thesis presents an
approach for reducing errors in software system by validating, at runtime,
that the restrictions are not violated. In this thesis the restrictions on the
communication are specified as expressions over the communication his-
tories of the components and the restrictions are represented either as an
automaton or a state machine.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most people working on software development agree that software devel-
opment is challenging and that many difficulties must be tackled during
the development. One might assume that the difficulties experienced in
developing software are due to the immaturity of the field of computer sci-
ence, and as the field advances and new techniques are made available the
difficulties will slowly disappear. In [10], Frederick Brooks argues against
this view. He divides the difficulties related to developing software into
essential and accidental difficulties. The accidental difficulties are due to
imperfect programming languages, execution environments, software de-
velopment methodologies etc, and can be dealt with by technical advances.
The essential difficulties are however due to the fact that “[...] software
development consists of working out all the details of a highly intricate,
interlocking set of concepts” [29]. No matter the advances in the field of
computer science, we will not be able to remove these essential difficulties
and we must therefore learn how to deal with them.
According to [29, 19] the most important part of software design is man-
aging the complexity of a software system. Managing complexity is im-
portant because the more complex a software system is, the harder it is to
reason about it and the more likely it is that we will make mistakes in the
design or in the code [29]. The basic strategy for dealing with complexity
is to divide the software system into smaller components that are as inde-
pendent of each other as possible. Each component is responsible for only
a small part of the functionality of the entire system. By dividing the sys-
tem into smaller components we hope to achieve a system where we can
safely ignore large parts of the systemwhen we are working on a compon-
ent. This principle is used at all levels in system design: from the division
of a system into subsystems or modules, modules into classes and, classes
into methods [29].
Although the components should be as independent as possible each com-
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ponent must communicate with at least one other component. To reduce
dependencies it is however important to restrict which components com-
municate with each other and how they communicate. We use the term
protocol to refer to all such restrictions on the communication. By reducing
dependencies, the system becomes simpler to reason about and therefore
simpler to design, implement and change.
For a software system to function properly, it is necessary that the compon-
ents follow the protocols. Several techniques for specifying protocols and
checking that the protocols are followed, are in common use. For instance
popular programming languages like Java and C++ have type restrictions
on the arguments to function1 calls. These type restrictions specify the al-
lowed type of the function call arguments. The compiler checks that the
type restrictions are obeyed. The same languages also have support for
access modifiers. Access modifiers are used to restrict the access to a com-
ponent or part of a component to other specific components. The compiler
can check that a component only accesses components to which it is gran-
ted access.
Type restrictions on function call arguments and access modifiers are useful
techniques, but they lack expressive power and they can only express cer-
tain types of restrictions. For instance, they cannot express protocols with
a state and they cannot look at communication beyond the current func-
tion call. To be able to express more complex protocols we need techniques
with more expressive power. In this thesis we investigate a technique that
takes the history of communication between the components into account.
This technique should not only make it possible to express more complex
protocols, but also make it possible to check that the components follow
the protocols. Checking that the protocols are followed is important since
it makes it possible to find and deal with errors. There are several different
approaches that can be used to check that a program does not contain er-
rors, i.e follows its specification. We take a detailed look at three different
approaches used to check that a program does not contain errors; testing,
formal methods and runtime verification. We then give a precise problem
statement, before we look at the structure of this thesis.
In this thesis we use the words program, system and software system in-
terchangeably.
1.1 Testing
Testing is the most common approach used to find errors in software. Test-
ing is “[...] the process of executing a program with the intent of finding
1In Java the word method is used instead of function.
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errors.” [16]. In other words the goal of testing is not to show that a pro-
gram is free from errors, but to show the presence of errors. This goal has
important implications on how testing is performed.
To perform testing we start by creating a set of test data and specify the ex-
pected output from the programwhen given the test data as input. We then
give the test data as input to the program, and a human or computer checks
whether the output from the program is as expected. If the program does
not produce the expected output we have found an error in the program.
A set of test data along with the specified correct output is commonly re-
ferred to as a test case [16]. Naively one could think that by creating all
possible test cases we would be able to to find all possible errors. This is
however not possible in general due to to the large or unbounded num-
ber of possible test cases [16, 27]. Also, testing does not work well for
non-deterministic programs since a test may sometimes show the presence
of an error and sometimes not. Multithreaded programs are often non-
deterministic and testing of multithreaded programs is therefore difficult.
1.2 Formal Methods
Testing can be used to find errors in software, however it can not be used
to show that no errors exist and it does not work well for non-deterministic
programs. Formal methods attempt to address these shortcomings in order
to produce programs that have fewer errors.
All formal methods are based on making a specification of the software in
a formal language. All statements in these formal languages must have
a precise mathematical meaning; i.e., a well defined semantics [21]. Since
the specifications are made using formal languages they are unambiguous,
and they can be reasoned about in a formal system.
It is a common misconception that formal methods can guarantee that soft-
ware is perfect. As discussed in [3] this is not true. All formal methods
function by making specifications that are models of the software, and
formal methods can only guarantee that the software is correct with re-
spect to the specification [23]. It is not possible to use formal methods or
any other method for that matter, to guarantee that the specification is cor-
rect. The specification is a model of the real world and this model might be
more or less correct. Since the real world is not a formal object, it is not pos-
sible to prove that the specification models the real world faithfully. This
is not unique to the field of computer science, but also applies to any other
field that uses models in the design and analysis of properties of real world
artifacts.
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Although formal methods cannot guarantee perfect software, formal meth-
ods have several useful properties. One of these properties is that formal
specifications are unambiguous. Since the specifications are unambiguous,
errors and inconsistencies in a specification are easier to find, thus leading
to better specifications [3]. In addition to providing better specifications, it
is possible to prove properties about the specifications and to prove that an
implementation correctly implements a specification. Currently, proving
that an implementation is correct with respect to a specification is difficult,
time consuming and in some cases not even possible. Proving that an im-
plementation is correct with respect to a specification is therefore only done
when the correctness of the implementation is critical. By critical we mean
software where errors have large financial or human costs.
1.3 Runtime Verification
A problem with formal methods is the high cost of verifying that an imple-
mentation is correct with respect to its specification [9]. Runtime verifica-
tion is a relatively new technique that tries to alleviate some of the problems
that are associated with formal verification, while keeping the advantages
of formal specifications.
Runtime verification is a software verification technique that combines formal
methods and testing. In runtime verification, specifications are made in
a formal language, and the verification is done by instrumenting the pro-
gram that should be verified, so that all relevant events in the program’s ex-
ecution are emitted to an observer. The observer then analyzes the events
with respect to a formal specification. Only single executions of the pro-
gram are analyzed, so runtime verification is expected to scale well, even
for large and complex programs. Since only single executions of a program
are analyzed, runtime verification can not be used to prove that a program
is correct with respect to a specification. However, by continuously check-
ing that an execution is correct, runtime verification can be used to prevent
errors from taking effect when they happen.
Several frameworks for runtime verification have been developed, includ-
ing JPaX [24] and Java-MaC [26]. Both of these frameworks use a variant of
temporal logic to make specifications.
1.3.1 Runtime Checking
Runtime verification has several similarities to other approaches that also
provide some form of runtime checking of implementations.
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Assertive programming [2] is a low-level approach for asserting that some
states are never reached in a program. In assertive programming the pro-
grammer inserts assertion statements into the code as the programmer deems
appropriate. The purpose of an assertion is that it should never evaluate
to false. If it does, there is an error in the implementation and the program
should be halted. Assertive programming is a programming technique and
there is not necessarily a connection between the assertions and the spe-
cification. The successful use of assertive programming depends heavily
on the diligence of the programmer.
Design By Contract (DBC) [5] is a specification technique that was first im-
plemented in the programming language Eiffel. A central concept in DBC
is the contract. A contract is an agreement between a class and its clients
about the obligations of both the class and its clients. The clients’ oblig-
ations are expressed as preconditions that must be true when the clients
call a function in the class. The obligations of the class are expressed as
postconditions that must be true when a function returns. The class is only
obliged to fulfill its obligations when the client satisfies the precondition.
The contracts used in DBC resemble the protocols between the compon-
ents. In DBC the class and its clients are the components and the contract
is the protocol of communication that they both must follow.
The notion of pre- and postconditions is not new to DBC. The novel idea in
DBC is that these contracts are compiled into assertions that are checked at
runtime. This ensures that the program will not run if the contracts have
been violated. This not only leads to an implementation that must sat-
isfy the specification, but also mean that the specification must be updated
along with the implementation.
Java Modeling Language (JML) is a formal behavioral interface specification
language for Java. In JML the behaviour of a module can be specified and
it is possible to check, at runtime, that a module behaves according to the
specification. JML hasmore expressive power than DBC and supports DBC
style contracts as a subset [12].
1.4 Problem Statement
Current techniques that are used to specify protocols between compon-
ents do not have enough expressive power. Though approaches like JML
greatly increase the expressibility over specification techniques like type
restriction, JML does not support specifications related to the order of com-
munication in multithreaded programs [34].
Testing and formal methods have significant limitations that make them
a poor choice for checking that the protocols are followed. Testing can
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only check a small number of all the possible communication histories and
formal methodsmust check somany communication histories that they are
not always applicable in practice. We will therefore use runtime verifica-
tion to check that the protocols are followed. Our main goal in this thesis
will be to answer the following question:
• Can runtime verification techniques support history-based specifica-
tion of protocols?
In order to address the main goal of the thesis, we investigate the following
questions in the setting of the Java programming language:
• Can the history of communication for a given component be recorded
in a way which is transparent to the program?
• Can we express history-based protocol specifications intuitively?
• Can history-basedprotocol specifications be applied to single-threaded
Java programs? Can they also be applied tomultithreaded programs?
• Can we represent history-based protocol specifications effectively for
runtime validation?
• Can history-based protocol monitoring and validation be used for er-
ror correction at the protocol level?
By using runtime verification to check that history-based protocol specific-
ations are followed, we hope to be able to reduce the number of errors in
a program, deal more gracefully with the errors that occur and reduce the
complexity of programs. We hope to reduce the number of errors by dis-
covering protocol violations during testing. Since we cannot test a program
completely, protocol violations will inevitable occur and by using runtime
verification we may discover these protocol violations at runtime and deal
with them gracefully. We hope that the specification of history-based pro-
tocols can help decrease the complexity of a program by reducing depend-
encies between components through explicit, well documented and up to
date specifications of the communication protocols. We believe that all of
this may in turn contribute to the development of software systems that
have fewer errors and that are easier to maintain and modify.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is divided into eight chapters.
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Chapter 2 gives a short introduction to automata theory. Automata theory
plays an important role in this thesis and this chapter gives several of
the definitions that we will use later on.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the entire runtime verification framework
and defines the terms used in the rest of the thesis. This chapter also
presents the core of the specification language that will be used in this
thesis.
Chapter 4 extends the specification language presented in the previous
chapter to provide more expressive power. We also show howwe can
represent the specifications in the extended specification language ef-
ficiently.
Chapter 5 extends the specifications from single-threaded programs tomul-
tithreaded programs. We discuss how the specifications should be
extended and show how we can represent the specifications for mul-
tithreaded programs efficiently.
Chapter 6 discusses error handling for the errors that are discovered by
the framework presented in this thesis. Particularly we discuss error
handling at the protocol level.
Chapter 7 explains a prototype implementation of the framework that is
presented in this thesis. The explanation focuses on the design of the
prototype and the essential details of the implementation.
Chapter 8 shows how we can use the presented framework on real ex-
amples. This chapter presents two examples and gives a more de-
tailed explanation of the examples and the corresponding specifica-
tions. This chapter also presents some simple benchmarks.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis and provides some pointers to furtherwork.
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Chapter 2
Central Concepts of Automata
Theory and Languages
This chapter gives a short introduction to automata theory and languages.
It is not meant as a complete guide to all aspects of the automata theory,
but to provide enough information to understand the definitions presen-
ted later in the thesis. We start with some central concepts of automata
theory, before looking at two possible automata definitions and how we
can represent an automaton.
2.1 Central Concepts
We will now define some of the central concepts in automata theory. All
the definitions in this section are from [22].
Alphabets
An alphabet is a finite, nonempty set of symbols. Conventionally, we
will use the symbol Σ for an alphabet.
Strings
A string is a finite sequence of symbols chosen from some alphabet.
Empty string The empty string is the string with zero occurrences of
symbols. The empty string, denoted ǫ, is a string that can be
chosen from any alphabet whatsoever.
String length The length of a string is the number of positions for
symbols in the string.
9
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Powers of an alphabet If Σ is an alphabet, we can express the set of
all strings of a certain length from that alphabet by using an ex-
ponential notation. We define Σk to be the set of strings of length
k from alphabet Σ. Note that Σ0 = {ǫ}, regardless of the alpha-
bet Σ.
The set of all strings over an alphabet Σ is conventionally de-
noted Σ∗.
String concatenation The concatenation of two strings x and y is de-
noted xy. The concatenation is formed by making a copy of x
followed by a copy of y.
Languages
A set of strings which are chosen from some Σ∗, where Σ is a particu-
lar alphabet, is called a language. If Σ is an alphabet, and L ⊆ Σ∗, then
L is a language over Σ.
Problems
A problem is the question of decidingwhether a given string is a mem-
ber of some particular language.
2.2 Finite State Automaton I
In this thesiswill use two different definitions of finite state automata (FSA).
The following definitions are from [22] and are useful for defining what
languages a finite state automaton accepts.
Deterministic finite state automaton
A deterministic finite state automaton (DFA) is a tuple (S,Σ, δ, s0, F)where
• S is a finite set of states,
• Σ is a finite set of input symbols,
• δ is a transition function that takes as arguments a state from S
and an input symbol from Σ and returns a state in S,
• s0 is the initial state, s0 ∈ S,
• F is a set of final or accepting states, F ⊆ S.
We use dot notation to refer to the various elements of an automaton. So to
refer to the set of states in the automaton A we write A.S, to refer to the
initial state we write A.s0, etc. This notation is used throughout the entire
thesis for all types of automata.
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Extended transition function
We now define the extended transition function for a deterministic finite state
automaton. The extended transition function is a function that takes as ar-
guments a state s and stringw and returns a state p. We denote the extended
transition function as δˆ and define it inductively as follows:
Definition
BASIS: δˆ(q, ǫ) = q. That is, if we are in state q and receive no inputs,
we are still in state q.
INDUCTION: Suppose w is a string on the form xa; that is, a is the
last symbol in w and x is the string consisting of all but the last
symbol. Then δˆ(q,w) = δ(δˆ(q, x), a).
With this definition we can define the language of an automaton. The lan-
guage of an automaton A = (S,Σ, δ, s0, F), denoted by L(A), is defined by
L(A) = {w|δˆ(s0,w) ∈ F}.
That is, the language of A is the set of strings w that takes the automaton
from the initial state s0 to one of the accepting states. If L is L(A) for some
deterministic finite state automaton A, then we say L is a regular language.
Non-deterministic finite state automaton
We also define a non-deterministic variant of the finite state automata. The
addition of non-determinism does not let us express any more languages
than with a deterministic finite state automaton. Using a non-deterministic
finite state automaton, we can however often express an automaton that
accepts a specific language in a simpler and more compact way than with
a deterministic automaton.
Definition
A non-deterministic finite state automaton is a tuple (S,Σ, δ, s0, F) where
• S is a finite set of states,
• Σ is a finite set of input symbols,
• δ is the transition function that takes as argument a state from S
and an input symbol Σ and returns a subset of S.
• s0 is the initial state, s0 ∈ S,
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• F is the set of final states, F ⊆ S
Notice that the only difference between the definition of a deterministic and
a non-deterministic finite state automaton is the transition function δ. In a
non-deterministic automaton the transition function return a set of states.
This makes it possible for a non-deterministic automaton to be in several
states at once.
We leave out the definition of the extended transition function for the non-
deterministic finite state automaton. Informally we say that a non-determi-
nistic finite state automaton accepts a string if after reading the string at
least one of the current states of the automaton is a final state.
2.3 Finite State Automaton II
Our current definition of a FSA is good for defining what languages the
automaton accepts. It is however not so well suited for some of the defin-
itions we create in subsequent chapters. We will therefore introduce a dif-
ferent definition that is similar to the one in [14]:
Definition
A finite state automaton is a tuple (S, s0, L, T, F), where
• S is a finite set of states.
• s0 is a distinguished initial state, s0 ∈ S.
• L is a finite set of labels.
• T is a set of transitions, T ⊆ (S × L× S)
• F is a set of final states, F ⊆ S
The difference between this definition and the one in Section 2.2 is on the
transitions. Instead of defining a transition function we here define a set
of transitions. Note that following this definition the automaton could be
either deterministic or non-deterministic. The definition also replaces the
input alphabet with a set of labels. The set of labels has the same function
as the input alphabet in the definition in Section 2.2.
Determinism
A finite state automaton (S, s0, L, T, F) is deterministic if, and only if,
∀s∀l, ((s, l, s′) ∈ T ∧ (s, l, s′′) ∈ T) → s′ ≡ s′′.
An automaton that is not deterministic is non-deterministic.
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Figure 2.1: A transition diagram for a deterministic finite state automaton.
2.4 Representations
There are several different possibilities for representing a finite state auto-
maton in accordance to these definitions. Below we give three different
representations of the same deterministic finite state automaton. We use
the definition from Section 2.3.
1. We can use five tuple notation. For example:
A = ({s0, s1, s2}, s0, {0, 1}, {(s0 , 0, s1), (s0, 1, s2), (s1, 0, s0), (s1, 1, s2),
(s2, 0, s2), (s2, 1, s2)}, {s1})
2. We can use a transition diagram, which is a graph. A transition dia-
gram for the same automaton as in 1 is shown in Figure 2.1.
3. A transition table, is a tabular listing of the set of transitions, which
indirectly tells us the start state (marked with →), the set of states,
the input alphabet and the final states (marked with ∗). A transition
table for the same automaton as in 1. is shown below.
0 1
→ s0 s1 s2
∗s1 s0 s2
s2 s2 s2
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2.5 Summary
This chapter has provided a short introduction to the theory of automata
and languages. We have especially looked at two different definitions of
automata and how we can represent automata. We will use these defini-
tions in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3
Overview of the Framework
In this chapter we present the foundations of a runtime verification frame-
work. The framework can be used to specify history-basedprotocols betwe-
en the components in a software system and to validate that the compon-
ents correctly implements the protocol. We start the chapter by defining
the terminology that we will use throughout this thesis and then move on
to discuss essential parts the framework. We end this chapter with an ex-
ample.
3.1 Terminology
A runtime verification framework is a framework that lets the usermake formal
specifications about the correctness of a piece of software and verify at
runtime that the piece of software behaves according to the specification.
We refer to the piece of software that is being specified and validated as a
component. A component is a part of a software system that offers a pre-
defined service to the rest of the system and that is able to communicate
with other parts of the system. A component might be small, like the im-
plementation of a list structure, or big, like the implementation of a data-
base. A component can itself be built from smaller components and be part
of a bigger component.
The part of the software system that is not part of the component is called
the component’s environment.
Since our purpose is to look at the communication protocols between com-
ponents we will not look at the internal actions of a component. Instead
we will look at the communication between the component and its envir-
onment. All communication between the component and its environment
from the moment the component was created at time to to some time t, is
15
16 CHAPTER 3. OVERVIEWOF THE FRAMEWORK
called the component’s communication history from to to t. We represent the
communication history of the component as a message sequence. For both
finite and infinite executions of the component, the communication history
of the component up to time t is always finite. Therefore the message se-
quence is finite as well.
To validate a component’s communication history we need a specification of
what a correct communication history is. Since we represent the commu-
nication history as a message sequence, the specification must specify the
correctness of a message sequence. In general it can be useful to view the
message sequences as the observable behavior between the component and
its environment. The specification can then specify the allowable interac-
tion between the component and its environment. We will often refer to the
specification as a protocol specification or just a protocol.
If a message sequence is correct according to the specification we say that
the message sequence conforms to or satisfies the specification. If a message
sequence is incorrect according to the specification we say that the message
sequence violates the specification.
3.2 Overview of the Runtime Verification Framework
The runtime verification framework developed in this thesis consists of
three main parts: Specification, Monitor and Verifier. Figure 3.1 shows a
conceptual view of the three parts. As shown in the figure we can think of
the runtime verification framework as being between the component and
its environment.
The Specification is an expression of what message sequences we allow the
component to perform. More specifically we say that the specification ex-
presses the allowable behavior of the component and its environment or
the protocol of communication between the component and its environ-
ment.
The Monitor is the part of the framework that is responsible for obtaining
information about the communication between the component and its en-
vironment. We call the process of obtaining this information formonitoring.
The Monitor monitors the communication between the component and its
environment and represents the communication as messages. Each time a
message is sent between the component and its environment it is intercep-
ted by the Monitor. When the Monitor intercepts a message this should be
done in a way that is transparent to both the component and its environ-
ment.
When the Monitor has intercepted a new message it is the responsibility of
the Verifier to validate that the message sequence extended with the new
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual view of the runtime verification framework.
message still satisfies the specification. This validation can be performed
either at runtime or the message sequences can be stored in an file and val-
idated later. Validating the message sequences at runtimemakes it possible
to perform runtime verification on non-terminating programs. Doing the
validation at runtime also opens the possibilities of runtime error handling.
We will come back to that in Chapter 6. We will first focus on validating
the message sequences at runtime.
3.3 Specification
We want to use runtime verification to validate that the communication
between a component and its environment is correct. It is important to note
that the communication can never be correct or incorrect in itself, but only
correct or incorrect with respect to a specification. In other words software
correctness is a relative notion [5]. We must therefore create a specification
of what is considred the correct communication between the component
and its clients.
In all our specifications we will assume that the component is the server in
a client/server relationship. In this setting a client is just any part of the
component’s environment that communicates with the component. The
component’s environment consists of one or more clients. The specifica-
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tions assume that the component is not active and only replies to requests
from its clients. In the cases that the component makes active connections
to clients in the environment, it takes the role of client with regard to that
contacted client. In this chapter we will limit our specifications to only one
active client. We will expand the specifications to several clients in Chapter
5.
3.3.1 Choice of Specification Language
The choice of specification language is important since the language we use
affects the type of properties we can express. There exist several different
specification languages for the specification of Java programs and we could
have chosen to extend one of these languages. However creating a new
specification language makes it easier to keep the specification language
simple and at the same time solve difficult problems like concurrency. Cre-
ating a new specification language also has some negative consequences.
The main problem is that the specification language will not be as refined
as it could be if it was an extension of an existing language. This extra
refinement is important when creating full-blown development tools, but
that is not our goal. We want to solve some of the difficult problems related
to runtime verification and the simplicity of the language is therefore more
important that the refinement of the language.
3.3.2 Finite State Automata as Specification Language
We have chosen to make all our specifications using various forms of finite
state automata (FSA) and we will refer to an automaton that expresses a
specification as a specification automaton.
The protocols specify the acceptable communication between a component
and its environment. A protocol is always in a certain state that reflects
what message have been sent between the component and its environment.
We call this the state of the protocol. The state of the protocol does not only
reflect what message has been sent, but also what messages it accepts.
There is a close connection between the state of a protocol and the state of
an automaton, and it is therefore natural to specify protocols using FSA.
FSA are also formally defined, which makes the protocol specifications un-
ambiguous.
In our specifications the states of the automaton will be equivalent to the
states of the protocol. The input alphabet or labels of the automata will be
the messages that are sent and received, and the transitions will represent
what messages are accepted in the different states of the protocol.
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This mapping is simple and intuitive, however in practice it is not practical
to express specifications directly as automata. The reason for this is that the
common notations used to express automata are too cumbersome and low-
level for our needs and though it may seem like a trivial problem, notations
matter1.
For this reason we will in this and the following chapters define a specific-
ation language that is a more high level description of an automaton. This
language will be a more natural way to express protocols and though it will
be limited in the beginning, it will be expanded later as we want to express
more properties. We will show that all specifications made in this language
can be translated to finite state automata.
3.3.3 Simple Specification Language
Wenow introduce the core of our specification language, called Simple Spe-
cification Language (SSL). We will expand SSL as needed in subsequent
chapters. The core of SSL is regular expressions that are used to express the
allowed message sequences. SSL uses a slightly different syntax than com-
mon regular expressions to make the message sequences easier to specify
and to make the specification easier to read.
SSL Syntax
We define the SSL syntax in Backus-Naur form (BNF). In all our syntax
definitions we will use ’symbol’ to refer to a symbol in SSL if there is a
similar symbol used in the definition that is part of the BNF syntax. For
instance the symbol | is used both in the BNF and in SSL, so | refers to the
symbol in BNF and ’|’ refers to the symbol in SSL.
<specification > : : = empty | <sequence >
<sequence > : : = <message > |
<sequence > : <sequence > |
’[’<sequence >’]’ ’*’ |
’[’<sequence >’]’ ’|’ ... ’|’ ’[’<sequence >’]’
<message > : : = epsilon | <string >
<string > : : = <symbol > <symbol >*
<symbol > : : = A | ... | Z | a | ... | z |
1 | ... | 9 | ’(’ | ’)’ | - | _ | # | , | .
1This is elegantly expressed in the following quote by Alfred N. Whitehead: “By re-
lieving the brain of all unnecessary work, a good notation sets it free to concentrate on
more advanced problems, and, in effect, increases the mental power of the race. Before the
introduction of the Arabic notation, multiplication was difficult, and the division even of
integers called into play the highest mathematical faculties.[...]”[28].
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We illustrate the syntax with an example. Note that white-spaces are not
part of the specification and can be added as seen fit.
[
[ Login : Access_granted ] |
[ Login : Access_denied ]
]*
3.3.4 Interpretation of SSL specifications
A regular expression defines a language and so does an SSL specification.
We will now define by induction exactly the interpretation of an SSL spe-
cification in terms of languages.
BASIS:
1. The specification empty denotes the empty language ∅.
2. The specification epsilon denotes the language {ǫ}; the lan-
guage consisting only of the empty symbol.
3. The specification consisting of only <message> denotes that lan-
guage {message}.
INDUCTION:
1. If A and B are SSL specifications denoting the languages L(A)
and L(B) respectively, then the specification A : B denotes the
language L(A : B) that is formed by taking any message se-
quence in L(A) and concatenating it with any message sequence
in L(B). In the terms of automata theory, ’:’ is the language con-
catenation operator.
2. If A and B are SSL specifications denoting the languages L(A)
and L(B) respectively, then the specification A|B denotes the lan-
guage L(A|B) that consists of all the message sequences that are
in L(A), in L(B) or in both. In the terms of automata theory, ’|’
is the language union operator.
3. If A is an SSL specifications denoting the language L(A), then
the specification A∗ denotes the language L(A∗) that can be for-
med by taking any number of message sequences from L(A)
possibly with repetitions and then concatenating them. In the
terms of automata theory, ’*’ is the closure operator.
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4. If A is an SSL specifications denoting the language L(A), then
the specification [A] also denotes the language L(A).
The symbols ’[’ and ’]’ are the grouping symbols. The reason we
use ’[’ and ’]’ instead of the standard ’(’ and ’)’ is that ’(’ and ’)’
arise naturally in many messages.
3.3.5 SSL and Automata
Since SSL specifications are regular expressions, they also have the same
properties as regular expressions. One of these properties is that all regu-
lar expressions can be translated into a non-deterministic finite state auto-
maton (NFA). Moreover any NFA can be translated into an equivalent de-
terministic finite state automaton (DFA). Proofs may be found in [22]. We
therefore know that all SSL specifications can be translated into a finite state
automaton.
An SSL specification can be translated either to a deterministic or non-
deterministic finite state automaton. For now we will accept the use of
both kinds of automata since they have the same expressive power. The
type of automaton used depends on the Verifier part of the framework.
3.4 Monitor
The Monitor is the part of the runtime verification framework responsible
for intercepting the communication between the component and its envir-
onment. The Monitor translates the communication to messages and then
forwards the messages to the Verifier.
3.4.1 Messages
We represent the communication between a component and its environ-
ment as a sequence of messages. We define a message to be the smallest
unit of communication that can occur between a component and one of its
clients. By that we mean that you cannot send only one part of a message.
The framework only deals with complete messages.
Communication between a component and its clients can happen in sev-
eral different ways. The two most common are through shared memory or
message passing. We have chosen to limit ourselves to only look at mes-
sage passing.
There are two common approaches to message passing. The first approach
is to look at messages sent over some network. For instance the messages
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that are exchanged between a web browser and a server connected to the
Internet. Here the component is the server, the web browser is the client
and the network is the Internet. In this approach the messages are strictly
data.
The other approach is to let method calls and method returns represent
messages. When calling a method in another object we send a message to
that object requesting it to perform some operation. After the operation
is completed the return value is sent as a message to the caller. Letting
method calls and returns be represented as messages is a common view in
Object Oriented Programming (OOP)[8, 7]. In this case the messages are
no longer just data, but represent an invocation of a piece of code located
somewhere in the program. This invocation moves the control flow from
one part of the program to another, resulting in the requested operation
being performed.
The two approaches have a lot in common. At a high level they appear to
be equal and there will not be that much difference between them when
it comes to pure validation of the message sequences. But there are some
fundamental differences thatmake the implementation of a runtime verific-
ation framework quite different depending on which approach we choose.
The choice will affect where the Monitor should look for messages. When
communicating over a network, messages are usually sent by putting the
messages on a queue and received by reading a different queue. To inter-
cept the communication, the Monitor only needs to monitor these queues.
If the messages are method calls there are no queues for messages, so the
Monitor needs to monitor all the different objects and see if there any calls
are made to the methods in the object.
We have chosen the approach that messages are method calls. This will
influence the implementation in many ways, especially the Monitor, but
we will try to keep most discussions general enough so that they apply to
network messages as well. We believe that there exist ways to make the
implementation work transparently with both views, but that would make
the implementation more complex and thus more difficult to understand.
We instead try to make the framework as simple as possible, while still
having enough expressive power to be interesting.
3.4.2 Message Type and Message Content
Amessage is split into two parts, message type and message content. Mes-
sage type tells us what kind of message it is. For instance a login message or
a logout message. In our case the message type of a method call would be
the name of the method. For the method returns, the message type will be
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“return” in addition to the name of the returning method. Message content
is the data in the message. In our case that means the value of the argu-
ments in the method call or the return value. In general there will be few
different types of message, while the number of different message contents
will be huge.
3.4.3 More Detailed Message Syntax
Now that we have decided to interpret method calls as messages we can
be more precise in the specification syntax for messages. We redefine the
syntax for the <message> part of SSL. The new syntax of SSL becomes:
<specification > : : = empty | <sequence >
<sequence > : : = <message > |
<sequence > : <sequence > |
’[’<sequence >’]’ ’*’ |
’[’<sequence >’]’ ’|’ ... ’|’ ’[’<sequence >’]’
<message > : : = epsilon | <message type >’(’< message content >’)’
<string > : : = <symbol > <symbol >*
<symbol > : : = A | ... | Z | a | ... | z |
1 | ... | 9 | ’(’ | ’)’ | - | _ | # | , | .
<message type > : : = [return] <string >
<message content > : : = ’’ | <string > (,<string >)*
3.4.4 Intercepting the Communication
Recall that we want the Monitor to intercept the messages in a transparent
way. With transparent we mean that neither the component nor its envir-
onment should be aware that a message is intercepted.
Nothing prevents us from intercepting messages in a non-transparent way,
in fact it is simpler. For instance a simple way of doing so is to let the com-
ponent notify the Monitor every time it either receives or sends a message.
We could implement this by calling a method in the Monitor each time a
message is sent or received.
The problemwith this approach becomes apparent when youwant to chan-
ge which messages to monitor. This would require a rewrite of some parts
of the component. Not only can this be tedious work, but it also has the
possibility of introducing new bugs into the component.
Non-transparent message interception is an example of poor separation
of concern and leads to an inflexible design. It forces us to be aware of
the monitoring while implementing the component, when the monitoring
is not part of the components tasks. Non-transparency introduces a tight
24 CHAPTER 3. OVERVIEWOF THE FRAMEWORK
coupling between the component and theMonitor and this coupling makes
it harder to make changes. Bymaking message interception transparent we
remove this coupling and get a more flexible design that lets us deal with
one problem at a time.
3.4.5 Relevant Messages
In a program there will be a large number of messages sent between the
component and its environment. All of these messages are not necessarily
of interest to the runtime verification framework. We therefore make a dis-
tinction between relevant and irrelevant messages. A relevant message is a
message that affects the correctness of a message sequence. An irrelevant
message does not affect the correctness of the message sequence. What is
considered to be a relevant or irrelevant message is defined by the specific-
ation.
The Monitor can chose to only intercept relevant messages to increase per-
formance.
3.5 Verifier
The Verifier is responsible for validating that the message sequence repres-
enting the communication history of the component satisfies the specifica-
tion. To do so the Verifier must receive messages from the Monitor. Each
time it receives a new message it must validate that the extended message
sequence still satisfies the specification.
3.5.1 An Alphabet of Messages
Amessagem is any sequence of characters taken from the setM = {a, . . . , z,
A, . . . ,Z, 1, . . . , 9, (, ), .,′ ,′ , #} such that the length of m is not larger than
some predefined finite length n. The size of n depends on the actual im-
plementation, but it must be finite. The alphabet of the specification auto-
maton is the set of all messages m ∈ M∗ such that the length of m is not
larger than n.
3.5.2 Validating a Message Sequence
Validating the message sequence with respect to the specification is the
main task of the Verifier. Therefore we want this validation to be easy to
understand and implement. At the same time it should be general enough
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to be applied to all specifications and all message sequences. We will use
the specification automata to perform the validation. An automaton can be
used to interpret sequences and it is this property that will be used in the
validation of the message sequences.
An automaton defines a language or a set of sequences, namely the set of
sequences that are accepted by the automaton. Specification automata spe-
cify all the valid message sequences, so it would seem that to validate a
message sequence, all we need to do is to check if the message sequence is
part of the set of sequences defined by the specification automaton. If the
message sequence is in the set of sequences accepted by specification auto-
maton it satisfies the specification. If the message sequence is not in the set
of sequences accepted by the specification automaton it violates the spe-
cification. This definition is easy to understand and simple to implement,
but it does not work when we are performing the validation at runtime.
The reason the normal interpretation of sequences does not work is that we
do not have access to the entire message sequence before the component
has finished executing. Since we want to perform the validation at runtime,
while the component is executing we must create a different definition of
what it means that a message sequence is satisfies the specification.
Definition
Amessage sequence violates the specification if from the current stat-
e(s) of the automaton no transitions are possible for the received mes-
sage. A message sequence that does not violate the specification sat-
isfies the specification.
This definition can be applied to both deterministic and non-deterministic
finite state automata andmakes it simple to validate themessage sequences
at runtime. Also a message sequence that violates the specification is dis-
covered immediately. This makes it possible to react to the erroneous mes-
sage sequence immediately.
Synchronous or Asynchronous Validation
Wewill assume in the remaining chapters that the validation of themessage
sequences is performed synchronously. Synchronous validation means that
when a message is intercepted and forwarded to the Verifier for validation,
the program cannot continue executing before the validation is finished.
With asynchronous validation the program can continue to execute before the
validation is finished. We will only perform synchronous validation since
that makes it possible to find and handled errors before they lead to failure.
We will come back to this in Chapter 6.
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1 def performTransitions ( message ):
newCurrentState = <empty list >
5 fo r state in currentStates :
fo r transition in state.transitions :
i f message == transition .message :
10
<add next state to newCurrentStates >
i f <newCurrentState is empty>:
<halt with error message >
15
currentStates = newCurrentState
Figure 3.2: Algorithm for validation of message sequences-
Asynchronous validation can however be a valid option in other cases. For
instance if the validation is performed by a program running on a different
machine than the monitored program.
3.5.3 Algorithm for Validation of Message Sequences
Wepresent an algorithm for validation ofmessage sequences. The algorithm
iswritten in pseudo code andworks for both deterministic and non-determ-
inistic specification automata. The algorithm is shown in Figure 3.2.
The algorithm works by iterating over all the current states of the specific-
ation automaton. For each of the current states, the algorithm checks if any
of the labels on the transitions from the state match the newmessage and if
so the end state of the transition is added to a list of the new current states
of the automaton. When the algorithm has iterated over all current states of
the automaton it checks the list of new current states. If this list is empty, no
transitions could be performed and the message sequence violates the spe-
cification. In this case, the program simply halts, and themessage sequence
that violated the specification is shown to the user.
3.6 Example: The HelloGoodbye Protocol
To put the concepts in this chapter in more context we will present a simple
example component and show how we can specify the component’s pro-
tocol.
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Client A
Client B Client C
Client D
Unknown client
Unknown client
Unknown client
Unknown client
Figure 3.3: A conceptual view of the HelloGoodbye protocol.
3.6.1 Informal Description
The HelloGoodbye protocol is simple. The protocol uses one server and
one or more clients. The server knows the names of a finite number of cli-
ents but any number of clients can be aware of the server. In our termino-
logy the component is the server and the clients are part of the components
environment. Figure 3.3 shows a conceptual view of the protocol. In the
figure the server communicates with four known clients and there are also
some unknown clients.
The server accepts the twomessages enter(<name>) and leave(<name>), where
<name> is used to identify the client. The server can reply with the mes-
sagesHello <name>, Goodbye <name>, I don’t know you and Not logged in. If a
client sends an enter(<name>)message to the server, the server replies with
Hello <name> if it knows the client. Otherwise it replies I don’t know you. If
a client sends a leave(<name>) message to the server it replies with I don’t
know you if it does not know the client. If it knows the client and the cli-
ent has sent an enter(<name>)message first, it replies with Goodbye <name>,
if the client has not sent a enter(<name>) message first, it replies with Not
logged in.
3.6.2 Specifying the Protocol
We will now make an SSL specification of the protocol. To make the spe-
cification simple we have limited ourself to one known client John and one
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enter( John ) return enter( Hello John ) leave( John )
return leave( Goodbye John )
enter( Mary ) return enter( I don’t know you )
return leave( I don’t know you )
return leave( Not logged in )
leave( Mary )
leave( John )
Figure 3.4: The automaton generated from the SSL specification of the Hel-
loGoodbye protocol
unknown client Mary. For all other clients the protocol is unspecified. Fig-
ure 3.4 shows the specification as a deterministic finite state automaton.
The SSL specification is shown below.
[
[ enter( John ) : re tu rn enter( Hello John ) :
leave( John ) : re tu rn leave( Goodbye John ) ] |
[ leave( John ) : re tu rn leave( Not logged in. ) ] |
[ enter( Mary ) : re tu rn enter( I don ’t know you ) ] |
[ leave( Mary ) : re tu rn enter( I don ’t know you ) ]
]*
3.7 Limitations of SSL
There are limitations to SSL’s expressive power and this becomes apparent
in the HelloGoodbye specification.
In the current version of SSL, specification of message content is imprac-
tical. We have to explicitly specify the message for each possible value of
the message content. This is not only impractical, but in many cases also
infeasible. For instance in the HelloGoodbye protocol specification there
might be thousands of known clients and an unbounded number of un-
known clients. We address this problem in Chapter 4.
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3.8 Summary
In this chapterwe have given an overview of the runtime verification frame-
work that wewill expand in the remaining chapters. We have discussed the
three main parts of the framework: Specification, Monitor and Verifier. We
have introduced the specification language SSL and seen that it has a close
connection to finite state automata. We have also discussed important as-
pects of the Monitor and the Verifier.
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Chapter 4
Extending the Specification
Language
In Chapter 3 we introduced a specification language that closely resembled
regular expressions and we saw that we could use the language to specify
message sequences. This way of specifying sequences is quite natural and
easy to work with, however we lack some expressive power. This became
especially apparent when wewanted to look at the message content as well
as the message type. We now expand the language so that the specification
of message content is included in a more natural way.
This extension of the language will also allow us to express properties
about not only the history of message types, but also the history of mes-
sage content.
The specification language will still be a high level description of a finite
state automaton and we will show how to translate a specification into a
finite state automaton. Wewill also introduce the concept of extended finite
state automata that will make it possible to reduce the number of states in
the specification automaton.
4.1 Extending SSL
In Chapter 3 we had the following specification.
[
[ enter( John ) : re tu rn enter( Hello John ) :
leave( John ) : re tu rn leave( Goodbye John ) ] |
[ leave( John ) : re tu rn leave( Not logged in. ) ] |
[ enter( Mary ) : re tu rn enter( I don ’t know you ) ] |
[ leave( Mary ) : re tu rn enter( I don ’t know you ) ]
31
32 CHAPTER 4. EXTENDING THE SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
]*
As we can see from this specification the server only knows one client,
John, and there is only one unknown client, Mary. If we want to expand
the specification with more known or unknown clients we must repeat all
sequences for the known or unknown clients. Below the specification is
expanded with the known client Peter.
[
[ enter( John ) : re tu rn enter( Hello John ) :
leave( John ) : re tu rn leave( Goodbye John ) ] |
[ leave( John ) : re tu rn leave( Not logged in ) ] |
[ enter( Peter ) : re tu rn enter( Hello Peter ) :
leave( Peter ) : re tu rn leave( Goodbye Peter ) ] |
[ leave( Peter ) : re tu rn leave( Not logged in ) ] |
[ enter( Mary ) : re tu rn enter( I don ’t know you ) ] |
[ leave( Mary ) : re tu rn enter( I don ’t know you ) ]
]*
This is obviously not a desirable way to specify a protocol. The number of
known clients could be thousands and the number of unknown clients is
likely to be millions and could even be unbounded. This example shows
how inadequate SSL is for expressing the content of the messages in a con-
cise way. We will now introduce some new constructs to SSL that let us
express properties about message content in an easier manner.
4.1.1 Arguments
So far the message content has just been a string and we had no way of re-
ferring to only part of the message content. We also had to specify the mes-
sage content exactly, however in practical applications the message content
can be defined by constraints and not just as a specific value. To deal with
this we introduce the argument construct. This construct lets us divide the
message content into zero or more arguments and lets us specify the value
of the argument not by specific values, but as a value from the domain of a
type. To keep the specification language simple we limit the type of argu-
ments to String.
Method calls and method returns are messages. For method calls the mes-
sage arguments will correspond to the arguments in the method call. For
method returns the message argument will be the return value.
The addition of arguments changes the syntax of the messages. The new
message syntax is shown below.
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<message > : : = epsilon |<message type >’(’ <arg list > ’)’
<message type > : : = [return] <string >
<arg list > : : = <empty list > | <argument >(, <argument > )*
<argument > : : = #<string >
<emptylist > : : = ’’
The examples below show the syntax for messages with different numbers
of arguments.
hello()
re tu rn enter( #name )
transfer ( #from, #to, #value )
4.1.2 Variables
We add variables to the specification. These variables are associated with
the state of the protocol. We call one particular assignment of values to
the variables an instance of the variables. We allow two different types of
variables, String and Set.
A Set variable contains a set of values of type String. The maximum num-
ber of elements in a Set is limited and dependent on the actual implement-
ation. We use {} to denote the empty Set.
A String variable can be contain any string that is not longer than a fixed
maximum length. The maximum length depends on the implementation,
but it must be finite. We use null to denote the empty string. Both the
Set and the String variables have a finite number of different values. This
is important when we later want to translate an SSL specification into an
automaton. We show the syntax for variables below.
<variable list > : : = <variable > <variable >*
<variable > : : = <type > <variable name > = <variable value >
<type > : : = (Set|String)
<variable name > : : = $<string >
<variable value > : : = <string value > | <set value >
<string value > : : = null | <string >
<set value > : : = ’{’ ’}’ | ’{’ <string > (, <string >)* ’}’
The examples below show how the syntax is used.
Set $activeClients = {}
Set $clients = { John, Peter }
St r ing $name = null
St r ing $username = Peter
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4.1.3 Predicates
We introduce predicates into SSL. A predicate is associated with one mes-
sage and is a boolean expression over the current instance of the variables
(see section 4.1.2) that limits when a message is accepted. When a predic-
ate is present, the message is not accepted unless the predicate is true. The
syntax for the predicates is shown below.
<predicate > : : = <atomic > |
not ’(’ <predicate > ’)’ |
’(’ <predicate > ’)’ and ’(’ <predicate > ’)’ |
’(’ <predicate > ’)’ or ’(’ <predicate > ’)’
<atomic > : : = true |
false |
<argument > <function > <variable name >
<function > : : = in | equals
The functions in and equals defined above are boolean functions. The
function in can only be used for Set variables and returns true if and only
if the value of the argument is in the current set of values for the variable.
The function equals returns true if and only if the value of the argument is
equal to the current value of the variable.
Below we show an example of the predicate syntax in use.
#name in $clients
not( #name in $clients )
#password equals $registredPassword
(# name in $clients ) and (not (# name in $loggedIn ))
4.1.4 Actions
We introduce actions to SSL. An action is associated with a message and
makes changes to the value of the variables. Three different actions are sup-
ported. We support the actions add-to and remove-from for Set variables
and the action assign-to for String variables. The add-to and remove-from
actions add a value or remove a value from a Set variable, respectively. Re-
moving a value v from a Set variable that does not contain v has no effect.
The assign-to action assigns a value to a String variable. The syntax for
the action construct is shown below.
<action list > : : = <action > (, <action >)*
<action > : : = (null |<argument >) <operation > <variable name >
<operation > : : = add -to | remove -from | assing -to
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The argument used in the action must be declared in the associated mes-
sage. We also allow the constant null, representing the empty string, to be
used instead of an argument. The following examples show the syntax in
use.
#name assign− to $seenName
#value add−to $values
null assign− to $seenName, #value remove−from $values
4.1.5 Sequence Expressions
Since we have now added predicates and actions that are associated with a
message, the sequence specification is no longer made up of just messages,
but by the associated predicates and actions as well. A message with an as-
sociated predicate and action is called a sequence expression. The new syntax
for the sequence specifications is shown below.
<sequence > : : = <sequence expr > |
<sequence > : <sequence > |
’[’<sequence >’]’ ’*’ |
’[’<sequence >’]’’|’...’|’’[’< sequence >’]’
<sequence expr > : : = <message >
[; check <predicate >]
[; do <action list >]
The examples below show the new syntax in use.
hello()
enter(# name ); check #name in $clients
enter(# name ); do #name add−to $seen
enter(# name ); check #name in $clients ; do #name add−to $seen
4.1.6 Alias
Alias is a new construct that lets us assign short names to sequence ex-
pressions in the specification. The alias construct is only present before the
specification is translated into an automaton and it is similar to, but simpler
than the #define construct in C [6]. During the parsing of the specification
all occurrences of an alias are replaced by the sequence expression the alias
represents.
The syntax of the alias is shown below.
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<alias list > : : = <alias > <alias >*
<alias > : : = alias <alias name > = <alias value >
<alias name > : : = <string > <string >*
<alias value > : : = <sequence expression >
Examples of the use of the construct is shown below.
a l i a s enter = enter(# name )
a l i a s enterCheck = enter(# name ); check #name in $clients
a l i a s enterDo = enter(# name ); do #name add−to $seen
4.1.7 The Complete Syntax
The complete syntax for the extended SSL language is shown in Figure 4.1
4.1.8 Example
We will now use the new constructs to make the specification we made in
the beginning of this chapter more flexible. The new specification is shown
in Figure 4.2. In the figure we have inserted some line breaks to make the
example easier to read.
In this new specification we have defined four new variables $clients,
$name, $notIn and $doNotKnow. The variable $clients is a set of all the
clients the server knows. The variable $name is the name used in the cur-
rent exchange between the server and a client. The variables $notIn and
$doNotKnow are used to hold the values of valid answers from the compon-
ent. In addition we have defined ten aliases.
The specification above is not shorter than the one we had before, however
it is easy to expand with more clients by just adding more names to the
set $clients and the unknown clients are now specified implicitly as the
complement set to $clients. In other words the specification is muchmore
flexible.
4.2 Extended Finite State Automata
In this sectionwewill introduce the extendedfinite state automaton (EFSA).
An EFSA is similar to a FSA, but with the addition of variables. The notion
of extended finite state automata or extended finite state machines is used
in various applications often with similar, but slightly different definitions
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<specification > : : = empty |
[<varible list >] [<alias list >] <sequence >
<variable list > : : = <variable > <variable >*
<variable > : : = <type > <variable name > = <variable value >
<type > : : = (Set|String)
<variable name > : : = $<string >
<variable value > : : = <string value > | <set value >
<string value > : : = null | <string >
<set value > : : = ’{’ ’}’ | ’{’ <string >(, <string >)* ’}’
<alias list > : : = <alias > <alias >*
<alias > : : = alias <alias name > = <alias value >
<alias name > : : = <string > <string >*
<alias value > : : = <sequence expression >
<sequence > : : = <sequence expr > |
<sequence > : <sequence > |
’[’<sequence >’]’ ’*’ |
’[’<sequence >’]’’|’...’|’’[’< sequence >’]’
<sequence expr > : : = <message >
[; check <predicate >]
[; do <action list >]
<message > : : = epsilon | <message type >’(’ <arg list > ’)’
<message type > : : = [return] <string >
<arg list > : : = <empty list > | <argument >(, <argument > )*
<argument > : : = #<string >
<emptylist > : : = ’’
<predicate > : : = <atomic > |
not ’(’ <predicate > ’)’ |
’(’ <predicate > ’)’ and ’(’ <predicate > ’)’ |
’(’ <predicate > ’)’ or ’(’ <predicate > ’)’
<atomic > : : = true |
false |
<argument > <function > <variable name >
<function > : : = in | equals
<action list > : : = <action > (, <action >)*
<action > : : = <argument > <operation > <variable name >
<operation > : : = add -to | remove -from | assing -to
<string > : : = <symbol > <symbol >*
<symbol > : : = A | ... | Z | a | ... | z |
1 | ... | 9 | ’(’ | ’)’ | - | _ | # | , | .
Figure 4.1: Syntax definition for extended SSL
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1 Set $clients = { John, Peter }
St r ing $name = null
St r ing $notIn = Not logged in
S t r ing $doNotKnow = I don ’t know you
5
a l i a s enterKnown = enter(# name );
check #name in $clients ; do #name assign− to $name
a l i a s hello = re tu rn enter(# value)
a l i a s leaveKnown = leave(# name ); check #name in $clients
10 a l i a s leaveNotIn = re tu rn leave(# val);
check #val equals $notIn
a l i a s leaveEntered = leave(# name ); check #name equals $name
a l i a s goodbye = re tu rn leave(# value); do null assign− to $name
a l i a s enterUnknown = enter(# name );
15 check not (# name in $clients )
a l i a s enterUnknownRet = re tu rn enter(#val);
check #name equals $doNotKow
a l i a s leaveUnknown = leave(# name );
check not (# name in $clients )
20 a l i a s leaveUnknownRet = re tu rn leave(#val);
check #name equals $doNotKow
[
[ enterKnown : hello : leaveEntered : goodbye ] |
25 [ leaveKnown : leaveNotIn ] |
[ enterUnknown : enterUnknownRet ] |
[ leaveUnknown : leaveUnknownRet ] |
]*
Figure 4.2: An example of how the extended SSL syntax can be used.
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[25, 15]. We will base our definition on the one given in [15] since it is easy
to implement efficiently. Wewill make some small changes to the definition
so that it fits our purpose better.
Definition
An extended finite state automaton is a tuple A = (S, s0,V, L, T, F),
where
• S is a finite set of states,
• s0 is a distinguished initial state, s0 ∈ S,
• V is finite set of named variables,
• L is a finite set of labels, the labels are of the form (pre,message,
post),
• T is a set of transitions, T ⊆ S× L× S
• F is a set of final states, F ⊆ S
The variables in V are tuples of the form (name, type, value). The name is a
unique name for the variable, type is the type of the variable and value is a
value from the domain of the variable type. We require that the domain of
all types is finite to ensure that all EFSA can be translated into FSA.Wewill
call a specific assignment of values to the variables in V an instance of V.
We use the notation Vi to refer to instance i of V. An instance of V is always
associated with a state in the automaton.
An instance Vi of V and an associated state s ∈ S is called a configuration of
the automaton A.
Determinism
An extended finite state automaton A = (S, s0,V, L, T, F) is deterministic if,
and only if, ∀s∀l, ((s, l, s′) ∈ T ∧ (s, l, s′′) ∈ T) → s′ ≡ s′′. If an automaton is
not deterministic we call it non-deterministic.
Keep in mind that a non-deterministic automaton can be in several states at
once [22] and to each of these states we associate an instance of V. In other
words a variable instance is not shared among all the current states.
Label Semantics
We will now introduce some additional semantics on the labels. We start
by defining the notion of preconditions and postconditions.
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precondition A precondition is a boolean expression over the current in-
stance of V. We use pre(Vi) to denote the evaluation of the precon-
dition pre on the variable instance Vi. We define the precondition
pre − skip as a precondition that always evaluates to true regardless
of the variable instance Vi.
postcondition A postcondition is a relation between the variable instance
before the transition and the variable instance after the transition. We
use post(Vi ,Vj) to denote the evaluation of the postcondition post on
the variable instances Vi and Vj. We define post− skip as a postcondi-
tion that evaluates to true if and only if the variables instances Vi and
Vj has the same value for all the variables.
If pre(Vi) evaluates to true we call a transition enabled. A transition that is
not enabled is unenabled. A transition can not be taken unless it is enabled.
When a transition is taken, the variable instanceVi associatedwith the state
before the transition is transformed into the variable instance Vj that is as-
sociated with the state after the transition. For all transitions that are taken
the postcondition associated with the transition should always evaluate to
true.
4.2.1 From EFSA to FSA
A nice property of our definition of an EFSA is that it can be translated
into an equivalent FSA. In fact an EFSA is an abstraction of a FSA that
includes variables as part of the state. This abstraction lets us describe the
automaton more succinctly.
Informally the translation from an EFSA to a FSA works by expanding the
states in the EFSAwith variable information and remove all the transitions
that do not satisfy the pre- and postcondition. This makes it possible to re-
move the pre- and postconditions since we know that all transitions satisfy
them.
Formally we expand an EFSA by performing the expansion product.
Expansion Product
The expansion product for an EFSA A is created in two steps. In the first
step we create some intermediate automata and in the next step we use the
intermediate automata to create a FSA.
A copy automaton is a copy of an EFSA but with actual values for the vari-
ables instead of symbolic variables. We create one copy automaton of A for
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each permutation of values for the variables in A.V. This creates n copies
of A, where n is the number of possible permutations of values for the vari-
ables. For each state in a copy automaton we make the variable values part
of the state. The copy automaton Ai correspond to the i-th permutation of
values of the variables. In all states in Ai the value for the variables are the
same. So while A has symbolic variables separated from the state, the copy
automata have actual values for the variables as part of the state.
For the copy automata we redefine the pre- and postconditions. A pre-
condition is a boolean expression over the state of the automaton. We use
pre(si) to denote the evaluation of the precondition pre on the state si. A
postcondition is a relation between the state before the transition and the
state after the transition. We use post(si , sj) to denote the evaluation of the
postcondition post on the states si and sj.
We enumerate all states in the automaton A with the numbers from 0 to
k − 1 where k is the number states in A. For all copy automata Ai the
enumeration of the states are the same as in A. So the state sj in a copy
automaton Ai is the same as the state sj in the automata A, but with actual
values for the variables. We denote states in the copy automaton Ai as s
i
j.
A1 is the copy automaton with the values of the variables identical to the
initial values in the specification.
Definition
Let A1, . . . , An be copy automata of an extended finite state auto-
maton A. The expansion product of A produces a finite state automaton
A′ where:
• A′.S = A1.S ∪ . . . ∪ An.S,
• A′.so = A1.so,
• A′.L = A1.L = . . . = An.L
• A′.T = {(si,message, s
m
j )| (si, l, sj) ∈ A1.T∪ . . .∪ An.T∧ l.pre(si)∧
l.post(si , s
m
j ) f or m ∈ {1, . . . , n}},
• A′.F = A1.F ∪ . . . ∪ An.F
The most interesting property of this definition is probably that a transition
start in one copy automaton and end in the copy automaton where the
postcondition is true. It is also important that the pre- and postconditions
have been removed from all the transitions. We can do this without any
loss of information since in A′ both pre and post is true for all transitions.
The expansion product for a small automaton with two states is shown in
Figure 4.3. In the figure the format on the transition labels are precondition;
message; postcondition. The postcondition expression x := truemeans
that the value of the variable x should be set to true.
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x = true; msg2(); x := false
x = false; msg2(); x := true
x = true
x = false
x = false
x = true
Automaton A
Expansion product of A
msg2()
msg2()
A1
A2
x = true; msg1(); post-skip
msg1()
s1 s2
s1
s1
s2
s2
Figure 4.3: A figure showing the expansion product of an automaton with
two states and one variable x. The value of x are either true or false. We
assume that true is the initial value of x.
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4.3 From SSL to EFSA
We have now made some extensive changes to the syntax of our specific-
ation language SSL. We will now show how to translate any SSL specific-
ation to an EFSA and thereby give the semantic interpretation of various
constructs.
We will divide the translation process into the following steps:
1. Expand all occurrences of aliases in the SSL specification.
2. Expand all occurrences of arguments with actual values in the SSL
specification.
3. Create the states and transitions from the sequence specification.
4. Translate the variables in the specification into V.
5. Translate the predicates into preconditions.
6. Translate the actions into postconditions.
The different steps will now be discussed in more detail using an example.
Example
The example is a specification of a simple component that lets clients add
values to the component and later check if a particular value has been ad-
ded earlier. The specification is shown in Figure 4.4.
Aliases
The alias construct is removed by the specification parser and all occur-
rences of an alias are expanded. This expansion alters the message parts of
the sequence specification, but the sequence specification is still a regular
expression. It can therefore still be translated into an automaton.
We illustrate the effect of the expansion on the specification given in Figure
4.4. The expanded specification is shown below.
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1 Set $values = {}
St r ing $true = 1
St r ing $false = 0
5 a l i a s add = add(# val); do #val add−to $values
a l i a s contains = contains (# val); check #val in $values
a l i a s returnContains = re tu rn contains (# val);
check #val equals $true
a l i a s notContain = contains (# val); not( check #val in $values )
10 a l i a s returnNotContains = re tu rn contains (# val);
check #val equals $false
[
[ add : re tu rn add () ] |
15 [ contains : returnContains ] |
[ notContains : returnNoContains ]
]*
Figure 4.4: An example specification of a simple component.
Set $values = {}
St r ing $true = 1
St r ing $false = 0
[
[ add (# val); do #val add−to $values : re tu rn add () ] |
[ contains (# val); check #val in $values :
re tu rn contains (# val); check #val equals $true ] |
[ contains (# val); not(check #val in $values ) :
re tu rn contains (# val); check #val equals $false ]
]*
Arguments
The argument construct is also removed by the specification parser sim-
ilarly to the removal of the alias construct. This is done by creating one
message and a possible corresponding predicate and action for each pos-
sible permutation of the argument values. Each of these new messages are
then connected by means of the ’|’ operator.
The use of arguments leads to the addition of one transition per possible
permutation of the argument values.
We illustrate the effect of replacing the arguments with actual values on
the example specification from Figure 4.4. In the example below the ali-
ases have already been expanded. In the example we assume that the only
possible argument values are 0 or 1.
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Set $values = {}
St r ing $true = 1
St r ing $false = 0
[
[ [ [add (0); do 0 add−to $values ] |
[add (1); do 1 add−to $values ] ] : re tu rn add () ] |
[ [ [contains (0); check 0 in $values ] |
[contains (1); check 1 in $values ] ] :
[ [ re tu rn contains (0); check 0 equals $true] |
[ re tu rn contains (1); check 1 equals $true] ] ] |
[ [ [contains (0); not( check 0 in $values)] |
[contains (1); not( check 1 in $values)] ] :
[ [ re tu rn contains (0); check 0 equals $false] |
[ re tu rn contains (1); check 1 equals $false] ] ]
]*
By expanding arguments to actual values, the specification is transformed
into a new regular expression. Since the new expanded specification is still
a regular expression it can be translated into an finite state automaton.
Sequence Specifications
We translate the sequence specification as we did in Chapter 3 and interpret
the predicates and actions as part of the message. Since the only alteration
we have done to the sequence specification is make the messages or sym-
bols longer we still have a regular expression. We can therefore translate
the sequence specification into an ordinary FSA.
Note that this translation leaves the pre and post part of the labels empty
and places all the information in the message part of the label.
We illustrate the changes on a small part of the example specification. Fig-
ure 4.5 (a) shows the automaton that is formed by translating the following
sequence specification:
[add (0); do 0 add−to $values] |
[add (1); do 1 add−to $values] ] : re tu rn add () ]
Predicates
We translate the predicate constructs into preconditions. If the message part
of the label has a predicate construct we translate the predicate into a pre-
condition. If the label does not have a predicate construct, we use pre− skip
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add(1); do 1 add-to $values
add(0); do 0 add-to $values
return add()
(a)
pre-skip; add(1); do 1 add-to $values
pre-skip; add(0); do 0 add-to $values
pre-skip; return add()
(b)
pre-skip; add(1); $values := $values U {1}
pre-skip; add(0); $values := $values U {0}
pre-skip; return add(); post-skip
(c)
Figure 4.5: Part of the automaton generated from the example specification.
(a) shows the automaton before the predicates and actions have been trans-
lated into pre- and postconditions. (b) show the automaton after the pre-
dicates have been translated into preconditions. (c) shows the automaton
after the actions have been translated into postconditions.
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as the precondition. We then remove the predicate construct from the mes-
sage part of the label and use the generated precondition as the pre part of
the label.
Figure 4.5 (b) shows the effect of translating the predicates into precondi-
tions on the example specification.
Actions
We translate the action constructs into postconditions. If the message part
of the label has an action construct we translate the action into a postcon-
dition. If the label does not have an action construct we use post − skip as
the postcondition. We then remove the action construct from the message
part of the label and use the generated postcondition as the post part of the
label.
Figure 4.5 (c) shows the effect of translating the actions into postconditions
on the example specification. In the example, the expression $values :=
$values U {0}means that the value of the variable $values after the trans-
ition is assigned the value of $values before the transition including the
value 0.
Variables
Each variable declaration in the specification is translated into a tuple (name,
type, value) and added to the set of variables V. The name, type and value
are those given in the specification. We associate the variables V with the
automaton that was generated from the sequence specification.
For the example specification shown in Figure 4.4 we would generate the
following set of variables:
V = {($values, Set, {}), ($true, String, 1), ($ f alse, String, 0)}
4.4 Implementation
We have seen that an extended SSL specification can be translated into an
EFSA. We can further translate the EFSA into an equivalent FSA.
It is clear that using a FSA for the validation of the message sequences is
not feasible in most case. For instance a specification with one string vari-
able, a max string length of 10 and only symbols from the English alphabet
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gives us approximately 1.4× 1014 different possible variable values1. If we
use a FSA we must encode this information directly into the states of the
automaton and as the example shows, that quickly leads to a huge number
of states.
Using an EFSA is better since it abstracts away the values of the variables
from the states and instead uses symbolic variables. This drastically re-
duces the number of needed states. However using a direct implementa-
tion of EFSA still has some problems related to the number of transitions.
Since the labels of the transitions of an EFSA can not contain symbolic argu-
ments we get the same problems with the EFSA transitions as we had with
the FSA states. To solve this we will allow the use of symbolic arguments
in the transition labels and generate the actual transitions of the automata
on-the-fly.
4.4.1 On-the-fly Generation of Transitions
Wewant to generate the actual transitions of the specification automaton as
we need them for the validation. We refer to this as on-the-fly generation of
transitions. We achieve on-the-fly generation of transitions by allowing the
transition labels in the specification automaton to contain symbolic argu-
ments. When a message is received we generate the actual transition label
from the argument values in the message. We do so by replacing all sym-
bolic arguments with the actual argument values in the received message.
By using symbolic arguments for the transition labels we drastically reduce
the number of needed transitions and by generating the transitions on-the-
fly we ensure that only the transitions we actually need are generated.
The whole validation process can be described in the following steps:
Initialization
Create an EFSA from the expanded SSL specification, but don’t re-
place the arguments in the labels with actual values.
Validation
1. Receive a message. This message contains actual values for the
arguments.
2. Generate all the transitions from the current states. This is done
by looking at the transitions from the current states of the EFSA
and by replacing all symbolic arguments in the transition labels
with actual argument values from the received message.
1(260 + 261 + . . . + 2610) ≈ 1.4× 1014
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3. For each possible transition we check if the transition is enabled
and if the received message matches the message in the message
part of the transition label.
4. If the transition was enabled and the message matched the mes-
sage part of the transition label, we perform the transition. Per-
forming the transition changes the variable instance so that the
postcondition is satisfied.
Note that the validation process works for both deterministic and non-
deterministic automata. In the case of a deterministic automaton there is
always only one current state and at most one transition can be taken from
the current state.
Violating the Specification
The definition of when a message sequence violates a specification is sim-
ilar to the one used in Chapter 3. We say that a message sequence violates
a specification if no transitions can be taken from any of the current states
when the automaton receives a message. Again we leave open what hap-
pens when a message sequence violates the specification. We will look at
different possibilities in Chapter 6.
4.4.2 Algorithm for Validating a Message Sequence
Tomake the process of validation of a message sequence clearer we present
an algorithm in pseudo-code. This algorithm is a modification of the one
used in Chapter 3. The algorithm is shown in Figure 4.6.
The main difference between this algorithm and the one in Chapter 3 is
that we must first generate the actual transitions before we can check if
a transition can be taken. To check if a transition can be taken we must
check if the received message match the message part of the transition and
check if the precondition evaluates to true. If both of these hold we can
perform the transition. When a transition is performed we put the next
state in the list of next states as before, but wemust also update the variable
instance for the next state to ensure that the postcondition evaluates to true
in the next state. As before the algorithm has found an error in the message
sequence if no transitions could be performed.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we have extended the specification language SSL, to give
it more expressive power. Specifically we extended the language with the
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1 def performTransitions ( message ):
newCurrentState = <empty list >
fo r state in currentStates :
5
genTransitions = <list of generated transitions >
fo r transition in genTransitions :
i f message == transition .message
10 and <transition is enabled >:
<add next state to newCurrentStates >
newInst = <update the var instance of state>
<associate newInst the next state>
15
i f <newCurrentState is empty>:
<halt with error message >
currentStates = newCurrentState
Figure 4.6: Algorithm for validation of message sequence using a EFSA.
following constructs: arguments, variables, predicates, actions and aliases.
We have also introduced the notion of an extended finite state automaton
(EFSA), which is basically is an finite state automaton (FSA) with variables.
We have showed how to translate an EFSA into an FSA and we have de-
scribed how to translate an extended SSL specification into an EFSA. Fi-
nally we have presented an implementation of the EFSA that reduced the
number of transitions to a feasible level. We also presented an algorithm
for performing the validation of message sequences using the presented
implementation of an EFSA.
Chapter 5
Specification and Validation of
Multithreaded Programs
In the previous chapters we assumed that the component only communic-
ates with one client. We will no longer make this assumption and in this
chapter we will see how we can deal with components that communicate
with multiple clients.
That a component has more than one client does not necessarily mean that
the component is part of a concurrent program1. The reason why we can
have multiple clients in a sequential program is that both the term compon-
ent and the term client has a intentionally wide definition. By having wide
definitions for these terms we get more freedom in our framework imple-
mentation, since we can narrow the definitions to fit the implementation
and not the other way around.
Though concurrency is not a requirement for multiple clients wewill in this
chapter generally assume that multiple clients also means that the program
that the component is part of is multithreaded.
In this chapter we assume that all specifications are made either using the
extended SSL syntax or directly as an EFSA.
5.1 Specification
To make it possible to validate the communication between a component
and multiple clients we must make some changes to the specifications. We
could choose to take multiple communicating clients into account at the
1A concurrent program is a program with multiple threads of control.
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level of SSL specifications which is the approach with the most express-
ive power. Specifying protocols for multiple clients is however difficult in
practice because the component’s communication with the different clients
can often be interleaved. For instance client A might send a message and
then client B sends a message before the component replies to the message
from client A. However it is also possible that client B sends a message first
and then gets a reply from the component before client A sends a message.
Both of these sequences might be valid and so could any other ordering
of the messages as long as a reply from the component happens after a
client has sent a message. Since all of these message sequences are valid
they must be expressed by the specification. The number of possible inter-
leavings increases exponentially when the number of clients and possible
messages increases, and it is therefore practically infeasible to specify all
the possible interleavings explicitly. Specifying the interleavings explicitly
also ties the specification to a predefined number of clients and in many
cases the number of clients is not known until the component is running.
To solve these two problems we sacrifice some expressibility for simpli-
city and let the communication with multiple clients be handle behind the
scenes by the framework. All the explicit specifications will therefore be
specifications about the communication between one component and one
client.
5.2 Separate Validation
One solution for dealing with multiple clients is separate validation. With
separate validation we validate the communication with one client inde-
pendent of the communication with the other clients. In other words the
components communication history is split into one message sequence per
client. Separate validation requires few changes to the implementation if
the validation with only one client is already supported. The only required
changes is to make one copy of the specification automaton for each client
and to route the message to each correct specification automaton.
Though separate validation is simple, it makes it impossible to validate a
component’s cross-client behaviour. Cross-client behaviour is behaviour that
is not only related to one client, but to several or all clients at once. For
instance a component that assigns unique session identifiers to all its cli-
ents should not use a session identifier more than once. This is an example
of cross-client behaviour. To validate this property we must look at the
component’s communication history with all its clients, not just the com-
munication history with one client.
Not only does separate validation reduce the number of properties that we
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can validate, it makes it impossible to validate some of the most interest-
ing properties and these properties are often also the hardest to implement
correctly.
5.3 Joint Validation
Since separate validation is too limiting we want to use joint validation in-
stead. When using joint validation the component’s entire communication
history is viewed as one message sequence. This makes it possible to val-
idate cross-client behaviour using joint validation. We must however pay
a price for this additional power. We have stated that for reasons of simpli-
city a specification should only express allowable communication between
the component and one client. However if this specification is translated
into a specification automaton this automaton will only accept communic-
ation with one client. We therefore need a way to automatically change
either the specification or the specification automaton to accept the com-
munication with several clients. We have chosen to the do the change in
the specification automaton instead of in the SSL specification. However
some minor changes are needed in the SSL syntax.
5.3.1 Achieving an Interleaving Specification
The specifications wemake do not take into account the possibility of inter-
leaving of communication when we have multiple clients. We must there-
fore find a way to automatically change the specification to allow interleav-
ing of communication. At the same time we want the approach to be flex-
ible enough to deal with more clients as they contact the server. To achieve
this we will use the notion of asynchronous automata product.
Asynchronous Automata Product
A known method for achieving all possible interleavings of transitions of
two finite state automata is the asynchronous automata product. The asyn-
chronous automata product is for instance used in the SPINmodel checker
[14]. Wewill define the asynchronous automata product for extended finite
state automata using the definition found in [15] with some slight modific-
ations.
Definition
The asynchronous automata product of a two EFSA A1 and A2 is an
EFSA A′, where
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• A′.S = A1.S× A2.S
• A′.s0 is the tuple (A1.s0, A2.s0)
• A′.V = A1.V ∪ A2.V
• A′.L = A1.L ∪ A2.L
• A′.T = {((s1, s2), l, (s
′
1, s
′
2)) ∈ A
′.S × A′.L × A′.S|((s1, l, s
′
1) ∈
A1.T ∧ s2 ≡ s
′
2) ∨((s2, l, s
′
2) ∈ A2.T ∧ s1 ≡ s
′
1)}
• A′.F = {(s1, s2) ∈ A
′.S|s1 ∈ A1.F ∨ s2 ∈ A2.F}
Note that the asynchronous automata product is a new extended finite state
automaton, so we can perform the asynchronous product on an automaton
that is already the asynchronous product of two or more automata.
What is most important about the definition of the asynchronous automata
product is that it achieves all possible interleavings of the transitions from
the two automata. In specification terms this means that a specification
automaton will accept all possible interleavings of messages from the dif-
ferent clients.
Shared Variables
When we use the asynchronous product to achieve interleaving of commu-
nication, all variables are shared. If we take the asynchronous product of
two automata A and B and both have the variable $clients, the product
automaton only contains one variable $clients . All pre- and postcon-
ditions in the product automaton referring to the variable $clients will
therefore refer to the same variable. In most cases this is exactly what we
want, however in some cases we want a unique variable for each client. We
can solve this by giving all variables we don’t want to be shared a unique
name. To achieve this in practice we must alter the SSL syntax and inter-
pretation for variables. The syntax for variable declaration will therefore
be altered to:
<variable > : : = <scope > <type > <variable name >=<variable value >
<scope > : : = (shared|exclusive )
<type > : : = (Set|String)
<variable name > : : = $<string >
<variable value > : : = <string value > | <set value >
<string value > : : = null | <string >
<set value > : : = ’{’ ’}’ | ’{’ <string >(, <string >)* ’}’
All variables marked with exclusive will automatically be given unique
names before the asynchronous product is performed and they will there-
fore be unique for each client. All variables marked with shared will not
be given unique names and will be shared across all clients.
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Problems with the Interleaving
Our approach to interleaving of communication allows all possible inter-
leavings, including those which are not necessarily desirable. For instance
in some cases a client might want exclusive access to the component for
some time. When the client has exclusive access, no other clients will get a
reply from the server. This is a property we cannot express using the asyn-
chronous automata product and if such properties are important to analyze
a different approach to interleaving is necessary.
True vs. Interleaving Concurrency
One could argue that it is possible for two different clients to send a mes-
sage to the component at the exact same time and if this is the case, our
model of interleaving would be incorrect. Though this is true, it is only a
problem if the component can actually deal with two message at the same
times. For now we assume that the component can only deal with one
message at the time and leave an extension to true concurrency to further
work.
5.4 Implementation of Joint Validation
A problem with using the asynchronous automata product for achieving
an interleaved specification is that the number of states in the specification
automaton can increase by several orders of magnitude for each new client.
For instance a specification automaton that contains 10 states with only one
communicating client, contains 10 ∗ 10 ∗ 10 ∗ 10 ∗ 10 ∗ 10 = 1.000.000 states
for 6 communicating clients.
As the number of states increases the memory requirement for storing the
automaton increases and so does the time it takes to perform a transition
and to perform the asynchronous product. At some point either the time
or memory requirements becomes too large and it becomes infeasible to
perform the validation.
An approach to this problem is to restrict either the number of states in the
automaton or the number of allowed clients. By setting such restrictions,
we can ensure that the time and memory requirements on the interleav-
ing never becomes too high. If this approach is used we must also decide
what to do when the limit is reached. Should further clients be denied ac-
cess to the component or should we drop the validation of the new client’s
communication?
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A completely different approach for dealing with large number of states is
to just reduce the overhead for each new communicating client. We will
now present such an approach.
5.4.1 Implementing the Asynchronous Automata Product
The implementation of the asynchronous automata product is based on a
few observations about the definition of the asynchronous automata product.
The first observation is that although we take the Cartesian product of the
states in the two argument automata, we won’t reach all those states and
we only really need a state when it is one of the current states of the auto-
maton. The second observation is that the transitions do not really change
much. They are just altered so they fit with the tuples that are the states in
the product automaton.
For these reasons we don’t actually do the asynchronous product, but in-
stead keep the two argument automata intact. The two argument automata
will share the same set of variables and the current state of the product
automaton will be a tuple with one state from each argument automaton.
When a message is received it leads to a transition in the argument auto-
maton corresponding to the client that the message belongs to. The idea is
illustrated in Figure 7.1.
In the figure we show the original specification automaton, the internal
view of the implementation and how the implementation looks from the
outside. The internal and external view is of the asynchronous product of
two copies of the specification automaton. The labels on the transitions
are not shown as they are not important at this point. As we can see from
the internal view we have two copies of the argument automata and the
current state of the automaton is a tuple with one state from each of the
automata. When a transitions is performed, the transition is taken in one
of the automata.
This implementation drastically reduces the number of states that are re-
quired. With a straightforward implementationwe could get several orders
of magnitude more states. With this implementation the number of states
will be the sum of the number of states in the two argument automata. For
instance if the specification automaton contains 10 states for one client it
will contain 10+ 10+ 10+ 10+ 10+ 10 = 60 for 6 clients.
In our case additional optimization is possible since all the argument auto-
mata are equivalent. We therefore just need one copy of the original spe-
cification automata and then just keep track of the current state of the auto-
maton for each client.
With these optimizations we get very low overhead for each client and in
many cases we don’t need to place any restrictions on the number of clients.
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Original Specification Automaton
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Figure 5.1: A conceptual view of the implementation of the asynchronous
automata product.
5.4.2 Finished Clients
It is likely that in some software systems a client will contact the compon-
ent and communicate with it for a short period of time and then never com-
municate with it again. Since the client will never communicate with the
component again, the specification does not need to take communication
with that particular client into account anymore. For reasons of efficiency
we could now try to reverse the process of the asynchronous product to
produce a smaller specification automaton. Reversing the asynchronous
product in this manner is not without problems. First of all it is not pos-
sible to determine if a message is the last message from the framework’s
point of view. A different problem is that by removing the trace of a clients
communication we can lose a vital part of the components communication
history. This can make validation of some protocols impossible.
Because of these problems we will not look further at how to reverse the
asynchronous product to reduce the size of the automaton and leave any
further study of the advantages and disadvantages of doing so to further
work.
58 CHAPTER 5. SPECIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF...
1 def performTransitions ( message ):
newCurrentState = <empty list >
currentStates = <current states fo r the client >
5
fo r state in currentStates :
genTransitions = <list of generated transitions >
10 fo r transition in genTransitions :
i f message == transition .message
and <transition i s enabled >:
15 <update variable instance >
<add next state to newCurrentStates >
i f <newCurrentState i s empty >:
<found specification violation >
20
<assign newCurrentState to current states fo r client >
Figure 5.2: Algorithm for validation of multi-client message sequences.
5.4.3 Algorithm for Validating a Multi-client Message Sequence
The algorithm shown in Figure 5.2 is similar to the algorithm in Chapter
4, but there is one important difference. This algorithm must take into ac-
count that each client has its own set of current states. So before we can
iterate over the set of current states we must get the current states for the
specific client. At the end of the algorithm the new current states must the
assigned to the current states of the client.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we have extended the framework to deal with specification
and validation of components that communicate with multiple clients. We
looked at different approaches for dealing with communication with mul-
tiple clients and ended up with an approach that let the framework auto-
matically expand the specifications to fit the number of communicating cli-
ents. We showed howwe could use the asynchronous automata product to
automatically expand the specification and how we could implement the
expanded specification efficiently. At the end of the chapter we gave an
algorithm for validating the communication from multiple clients.
Chapter 6
Error Handling
This chapter introduces error handling into the framework described in the
previous chapters. The chapter starts by giving a short introduction to er-
ror handling and dependability. We then present an extension to the frame-
work that makes it possible to perform error handling at the protocol level,
before we look at some strategies for using the extension in error handling.
We end the chapter by extending SSL to support the error handling.
6.1 Error Handling and Dependability
The definitions of the terms used in this section are taken from [20].
The function of a software system is what the software system is intended
to do. The behaviour of a software system is what a software system does to
implement its function. The service delivered by a system is its behaviour as
it is preceived by a user. Correct service is delivered when a software system
implements its function.
We differentiate between failures, errors and faults. A failure is an event that
occurs when the delivered service deviates from the correct service. A fail-
ure is a transition from correct service to incorrect service, i.e., from imple-
menting the system’s function to not implementing the system’s function.
An error is that part of the system state that may cause a subsequent failure:
a failure occurs when an error alters a service. A fault is the adjudged or
hypothesized cause of an error. A fault is active when it produces an error,
otherwise it is dormant.
Fault tolerance is intended to preserve the delivery of correct service in the
presence of active faults. It is implemented by error detection and sub-
sequent system recovery. The error detection is in our case done by the
framework discussed in the previous chapters. This chapter deals with
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the system recovery when errors are detected. There are two different ap-
proaches to system recovery; error handling eliminates errors from the sys-
tem state and fault handling prevents located faults from being activated
again. We will in this chapter only concentrate on error handling.
Following the definitions above, the purpose of this chapter is to extend the
framework so that error handling can be performed. The error handling
will eliminate errors from the system states and thereby prevent failures in
the services offered by a component.
6.2 Extending the Framework
We will now present an extension to the framework that allows us to per-
form error handling at the protocol level. By that wemean that the protocol
specification also specifies the error handling. There are several ways that
the framework can be extended to allow error handling. The extension that
we will make was chosen because it makes it possible to handle each error
individually and in some cases the error handling can also be done com-
pletely transparently.
In the previous chapters we have used a variant of finite state automata
as the underlying specification language. The most important part of the
framework extension in this chapter is to replace finite state automata with
finite state machines [4] as the underlying specification language.
The difference between a finite state automaton and a finite state machine
is that a finite state machines can produce output in addition to receiving
input. This make a finite state machine a more powerful concept.
We will now define an extended finite state machine (EFSM) that we will
use instead of an EFSA as the specification language. We base our approach
on the definition of Mealy finite state machines. In a Mealy machine the
output depends on the current state and the current input in contrast to a
Moore machine where it only depends on the current state.
Definition
An extended finite state machine (EFSM) is a 7-tuple M = (S, so,V, I,
O, T, F), where,
• S is a finite set of states,
• s0 is a distinguished initial state, s0 ∈ S,
• V is finite set of named variables,
• I is a set of input symbols of the form (pre,message, post),
6.2. EXTENDING THE FRAMEWORK 61
• O is a set of output symbols,
• T is a set of transitions, T ⊆ S× I ×O× S,
• F is a set of final states, F ⊆ S
The important changes in this definition is the addition of a set of output
symbols and that the output symbols are part of the transitions.
6.2.1 Using the Extension
The idea behind the extension is to use the output from the specification fi-
nite state machine to handle errors. The specification machine will receive
the messages that are sent as input and based on the input and the current
state of the machine it will produce a message as output. The output mes-
sage will be the message that is actually sent between the component and
the client. This makes it possible for the framework to change an erroneous
message before it results in a failure, and thereby make the system more
fault tolerant.
A conceptual view of how the frameworkworkswith the extension is shown
in Figure 7.1. The numbers in the following list correspond to the numbers
in the figure.
1. The client sends a message to the component.
2. The framework intercepts the message and the message is sent to the
EFSM.
3. The EFSM outputs a message that may or may not be the same mes-
sage that it received.
4. The framework receives the outputmessage from the EFSMand sends
the output message to the component.
5. The component sends a return message to the client.
6. The framework intercepts the return message and forwards it to the
EFSM.
7. The EFSM outputs a message that may or may not be the same mes-
sage that it received.
8. The framework receives the outputmessage from the EFSMand sends
the output message to the client.
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Figure 6.1: A conceptual view of the framework with the new specification
model.
Determinism
Our use of the finite state machines requires that the specification machine
is deterministic. The reason is that for a given state and a given input a
non-deterministic machine can have more than one output, a deterministic
machine can have only one. With more than one output from the machine
it becomes hard to choose which output message should actually be sent.
By requiring that the machine is deterministic we avoid having to make a
choice between the different outputs and the framework becomes simpler.
Underspecification
We will allow underspecification when it comes to specifying error hand-
ling. In other words it is not required to add error handling for all possible
erroneousmessages. If an erroneousmessage is not specifically handled by
the specification machine, the specification machine halts and it is then up
to the framework to decide on an appropriate action.
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Allowing underspecification of error handling makes is easier to write the
specification since not all possible cases must be taken into account, but at
the same time the unspecified errors might not be handled appropriately.
6.2.2 Specifications in the Extended Formalism
When making specifications in the extended formalism we split the spe-
cification into two parts; one part is the protocol specification and the other
is the error handling specification.
The protocol part of the specification is similar to the specifications made in
the previous chapters with the addition of output for all the transitions. For
all transitions used in the protocol specification of the previous chapters,
the output is identical to the input. As a consequence of this, as long as
the client and the component both follow the protocol, no messages will be
altered.
In addition to the protocol part of the specification we also specify the error
handling in the specification machine. For each error wewant to handle we
create one transition. The output from this transition should be a message
that in some way handles the error.
To make it easier to reason about a specification that is used for both spe-
cifying the communication protocol and the error handling we split the
type of transitions into two different groups; protocol transitions and error
handling transitions.
Protocol transitions Protocol transitions are all the transitions that have
output identical to the input. The protocol transitions specify the
communication protocol between the component and a client. A spe-
cification made using the formalism in the previous chapters would
only have protocol transitions.
Error handling transitions Error handling transitions are all transitionswith
output that is different from the input. As the name suggests all trans-
itions that give an output different from the input should do so to
handle errors. With this definition we also make the assumption that
an error can not be fixed by having output identical to the input.
We show an example of such a specification in Figure 6.2. In the example
we specify a simple protocol in which the component accepts the messages
hello() and goodbye(). The component should reply with Hello for a hello()
message and with Goodbye for a goodbye() message. In addition to specify-
ing the protocol we have added two error handling transitions. These two
error handling transitions alter the reply message from the component to
ensure that the reply is what the client expects.
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hello()/hello()
return( Hello )/return( Hello )
goodbye()/goodbye()
return( Goodbye )/return( Goodbye )
return( Hello )/return( Goodbye )
return( Goodbye )/return( Hello )
Figure 6.2: A small specification machine with both protocol and error
handling transitions. The format on the transition labels are input mes-
sage/output message.
6.2.3 Validating the Message Sequences
The validation of the message sequences will be quite similar to the valid-
ation in the previous chapters, but with the possibility that the framework
can change the actual message sequences to perform error handling. Since
we allow underspecification of error handling we can still get message se-
quences that are not handled by the specification automaton and in those
cases the automaton halts just as it did before.
6.3 Error Handling Strategies
In Section 6.2 we extended the framework with output on all transitions.
We also gave an overview of how we could use the output to change the
messages that are sent between the client and the component with the in-
tention of preventing failures. However, aside from handling errors chan-
ging a message can also create errors. For instance if the client sends the
message less( number1, number2 ) and themessage is changed to less(
number2, number1 ) the result from the component is not likely to be the
same. When the client uses the result, it has the wrong result and an error
might occur. Changing the message as in the example might seem like an
obviously bad idea, but the example illustrates that there should be some
restrictions on how the messages are changed.
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In this section we will present one error handling strategy that changes
message to handle errors. We will also look at how the framework can deal
with errors when error handling is not specified.
6.3.1 Strategy: Limited Alteration of Message Content
The possibility of altering message content can be used in many different
error handling strategies. Here we limit ourself to altering the message
content of return messages for the purpose of ensuring that information is
not given to clients that should not have access to the information. We do so
by replacing the information in the returnmessage by either no information
or dummy information.
We will illustrate the usefulness of the strategy with an example. In a web
based banking application clients can access their account information and
perform transactions, but only if they have been authorized first. If there is
an error in the banking application an unauthorized client might be able to
view account information. If the specification of the protocol is complete,
the framework will detect if the banking application gives information to
an unauthorized client. To correct the error the specification machine re-
places the message content with no information. By doing so the frame-
work ensures that information does not fall into the wrong hands.
Formally the strategy works by providing one transition for each error that
is handled. The output from the transitions is a return message where the
information has been replaced with either no information or dummy in-
formation. The end state of the transition should be the same as if the error
had not occurred. The reason for using the same end state for the error
transitions as the protocol transitions is that the purpose of the content
change is to let the communication continue as if nothing has happened.
If the error transitions lead to another state we need some duplication in
the specification machine so that the subsequent messages to be analyzed
correctly.
6.3.2 Dealing with Unhandled Errors
Since we allow underspecification of error handling there might be some
errors that are not handled directly by the specification machines. How
to handle these errors falls outside the scope of the specification machine,
but should be dealt with by the framework. The framework has several
possibilities for handling these errors.
Termination The framework can terminate the program. This termination
can be done gracefully by trying to release any resources the program
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holds and finish any vital transactions. The termination can also be
less graceful by just exiting the program directly with an error mes-
sage. The only argument in favour of the last form of termination is
that it requires no knowledge of the program and the program can
also be totally unaware of the monitoring.
Termination of the program should be a last resort since it reduces
the availability of the program and can have serious consequences
if not done properly. Termination is however better than letting the
program continue to execute, since after the error has occurred the
program is no longer viable [2].
Thread termination Thread termination is less drastic than terminating
the whole program. It must however be used with care as in many
programs each thread is vital to the correct behaviour of the program.
For instance we can imagine a program with two threads, A and B.
A and B together perform some form of parallel computation and at
certain intervals they must be synchronized by exchanging data. Lets
say that thread B finishes its part of the computation, it then waits for
thread A to finish so that they exchange data. However thread A has
violated the specification and has been terminated. Thread B is not
aware of this and will wait forever, so the program will hang. A vari-
ant of this approach is to also terminate all threads communicating
with thread A. This can however quickly get very complicated since
we do not necessarily know all of the threads that communicate with
thread A.
The example illustrates that the strategy is most useful in programs
that have independent threads and the termination of one thread
does not affect the execution of the other threads. Examples of such
programs are web servers that often create an independent thread for
each request.
Casting an exception Casting an exception is a way to inform the sender
that it has caused an error and give it the possibility of fixing the error.
It is important to note that the use of this strategy is not transparent
to the program. Some part of the program must be able to deal with
the error.
Calling an error handling method Instead of trying to implement an ap-
propriate error handling strategy into the framework we instead let
the program take care of the errors. This approach can give error
handling strategies that are very appropriate for the program, but in-
troduces dependencies between the verification framework and the
program that are undesired. We have not had the opportunity to
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study how severe these dependencies are and can therefore not con-
clude if this strategy should be used.
Restart the program Restarting the program is often the only work around
for software errors known as Heisenbugs1 and it is often used in non-
trivial systems [13]. Instead of restarting the whole program only
parts of it can be restarted to improve availability. A more sophistic-
ated strategy for restarting is discussed in [13].
6.4 SSL and Finite State Machines
The extended finite state machines let us express a wide variety of different
error handling strategies. We will now extend our specification language
SSL such that we can express the error handling strategy that was described
in Section 6.3.
6.4.1 The Output Construct
We want to add support for output on the transitions to SSL. We do so
by introducing the output construct. The output construct is used to spe-
cifically express the output of a transition. The construct does not make it
possible to change the end state of a transition.
The addition of output changes the syntax for <sequence expr>. The new
syntax is shown below.
<sequence expr > : : = <message >
[; check <predicate >]
[; do <action list >]
[; output <output message >]
<output message > : : = <message >
The keyword ouput is used to identify the construct and <output message>
is any valid message.
The interpretation of the output construct is straightforward. If the output
construct is present the output of the transitions becomes the specified out-
put message. If the construct is not present the output is assumed to be
identical to the input. Consequently, old SSL specifications from previous
chapters remain valid.
1A Heisenbug is an error that disappears when it is examined.
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1 shared Set $clients = { John, Mary }
a l i a s getInfoKnown = getInfo (# client);
check #client in $clients
5 a l i a s getInfoUnknown = getInfo (# client);
check not (# client in $clients )
a l i a s returnError = re tu rn getInfo (# info );
check not (# info equals null );
output re tu rn (null )
10 a l i a s returnUnknownOk = re tu rn getInfo (# info );
check #info equals null
[
[ getInfoKnown : re tu rn getInfo (# info ) ] |
15 [ getInfoUnknown : [ returnUnkownOk ] | [ returnError ] ]
]*
Figure 6.3: An example of how to use SSL to specify error handling.
With the output construct it becomes trivial to translate an SSL specification
to an EFSM using the algorithm for translating an SSL specification into an
EFSA (see Chapter 4). The only necessary addition to the algorithm is to
add output to all transitions, and the output construct specifies what the
output should be.
6.4.2 Example
We now illustrate how we can use SSL to specify error handling on an ex-
ample. In the example both known and unknown clients can send the mes-
sage getInfo(client). If the client is known, information is returned. If
the client is not known, the value null is returned. The specification also
specifies error handling in case the component returns information to an
unknown client. If that happens the information is replaced with null.
The specification is shown in Figure 6.3.
In the specification we have two sequence expressions for when the com-
ponent answers the call from an unknown client. One of the sequence ex-
pressions is used when the return value is null as it should be. The other
sequence expression is used when the return value is not null. The last se-
quence expression uses the output construct to change the output to null
such that the protocol is not violated.
This is the pattern for how to specify error handling using SSL. We create
one sequence expression for when the return value is as expected and one
sequence expression for when the return value is not as expected. The se-
quence expression for when the return value is not as expected changes the
return value so that the protocol is not violated.
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6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have altered the framework from using extended finite
state automata to using extended finite state machines. The reason for the
change in the framework was to support error handling at the protocol
level by letting the message be changed by the specification machine.
We then presented one possible strategy for how to handle errors by chan-
ging the message. We also looked at some possibilities for dealing with the
error that are not taken care of by the specification.
Finally we extended SSL to support output on the transitions and showed
how we could use SSL to specify the error handling.
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Chapter 7
A Prototype Implementation of
the Runtime Verification
Framework
In this chapter we give a detailed explanation of a prototype implement-
ation of the framework that we have discussed in the previous chapters.
We start by looking at the design goals for the prototype that will explain
the motivation behind the decisions we made when we implemented the
prototype. We then give a brief overview of the implementation before we
discuss the various parts of the implementation in more detail.
7.1 Design Goals
To guide the implementation of the prototype we created the following
design goals:
Easy to change Since the development of the prototype is a continuous ef-
fort, the implementation has to be easy to change so that new ideas
and concepts can be incorporated quickly.
Simple The prototype implementation should be as simple as possible
without sacrificing the features of the implementation. This means
that all algorithms should be chosen out of simplicity of understand-
ing and implementation rather than execution speed andmemory us-
age.
By making the implementation as simple as possible it will be easier
to understand and quicker to implement. This will make it possible
to implement more features in the same time frame.
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Testable The prototype implementation should make it easy to write tests
that execute the various parts of the application. By facilitating test-
ing, it should be easier to find errors in the code and this will in turn
lead to a better implementation in a shorter amount of time.
7.2 Implementation Overview
The purpose of the prototype is to provide a proof of concept implementa-
tion of the framework described in the previous chapters.
The prototype uses single objects as components. Though it is possible to
use a collection of objects or a whole program as a component, we have
for reasons of simplicity of implementation and because it is also natural
in many cases, chosen to only regard single objects as components. The
prototype uses threads as clients. This is again only one possible solution.
We discuss why we use threads as clients further in Section 7.4.
7.2.1 Prototype Parts
We have divided the prototype into different parts with different respons-
ibilities. The main parts of the prototype are listed below:
Specification Parser. The Specification Parser reads an extended SSL spe-
cification and from the specification it generates an extended finite
state machine and stores it in XML [1] format.
Monitor Generator. The Monitor Generator reads the extended SSL spe-
cification and from the specification it generates a specific monitor
for the monitored objects and the specification.
Monitor The Monitor is generated by the Monitor Generator and it is re-
sponsible formonitoring the sending and receiving ofmessages. Each
time it intercepts a message it forwards the message to the Verifier.
Verifier The Verifier is responsible for validating the sequence of messages
that it receives from the Monitor. The Verifier is also responsible for
handling the errors that are not handled by the specification.
Only the Monitor and the Verifier are active at runtime. The Specification
Parser and the Monitor Generator are only used before the program is run-
ning. A conceptual view of the parts are shown in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: A conceptual view of how the main parts of the prototype are
related.
7.2.2 Choice of Programming Language
The choice of programming language is important for the implementation
of the prototype. We chose to use two different languages for the different
parts of the implementation since there were different requirements for the
various parts of the implementation. We will not give a comparison of
the two languages, but instead list the reasons for using each particular
language.
Java
We used Java1 to implement the Monitor and the Verifier. One of the im-
portant aspects of the Monitor and the Verifier is that they must interface
directly with themonitored program. Themonitored programs are all writ-
ten in Java and it is much simpler to interface with these programs if both
the Monitor and the Verifier are implemented in Java as well.
Java is also a popular language among both software developers and re-
searchers. There are therefore many third party programs available and
also a lot of information available on even very advanced uses of the lan-
guage. Java also has a large standard library that is well documented [30].
1http://java.sun.com
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Python
We used Python2 to implement the Specification Parser and the Monitor
Generator. Python has good support for string manipulation and regular
expressions and that makes it a good choice both for text parsing and text
generation. Python’s native syntax for lists and dictionaries also makes it
easier to create unit tests than in languages like Java.
7.3 Specification Parser
The specification parser is implemented in Python as a standalone pro-
gram. The program parses an extended SSL specification and generates an
extended finite state machine (EFSM). The generated EFSM has transition
labels with symbolic arguments.
The generated EFSM is stored in a file using an XML format. We chose
to use an XML format because it is humanly readable, is highly structured
and because Java has support for reading XML files.
Syntax Changes
The Specification Parser makes a few changes to the SSL syntax that is
described in the previous chapters. These changes do not change the se-
mantics of the specifications, but they make it simpler to parse the specific-
ation.
To make it easier to separate the different sections of the specification we
require that the variables section starts with the line //variables, the alias
section starts with the line //aliases and that the sequence specification
section starts with the line //sequence. This is a requirement even if the
section is empty, so an empty variable section would still require the line
//variables in the specification.
The specification parser also assumes that in the sequence specification all
the sub-sequences are started with the message separation symbol ’:’. In
addition we require the use of a ’:’ symbol directly before and after a sub-
sequence with two exceptions. If the union operator ’|’ is used between
two sub-sequences, then we shall not insert a ’:’ symbol before or after the
’|’ symbol. And if the ’]’ symbol is followed by the ’*’, the ’:’ symbol should
be inserted after ’*’ and not after ’]’. By adding the ’:’ in this way, each ’:’
will mark a state in the EFSM before the epsilon transitions are removed.
Example: For instance, the specification
2http://www.python.org/
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shared Set $clients = { John, Mary }
a l i a s hello = hello( #name )
a l i a s goodbye = goodbye( #name )
[
[ hello() : re tu rn hello () ] |
[ leave() : re tu rn leave () ]
]*
is replaced by the following specification:
// variables
shared Set $clients = { John, Mary }
// aliases
a l i a s hello = hello( #name )
a l i a s goodbye = goodbye( #name )// sequence
// sequence
: [ :
[ : hello() : re tu rn hello() : ] |
[ : leave() : re tu rn leave() : ] :
]* :
7.3.1 Parsing Algorithm
The complete parsing is done by two separate algorithms. The first al-
gorithm parses the extended SSL specification and generates an EFSM M.
The second algorithm creates an newEFSMN. N accepts the samemessage
sequences as M, but N is without epsilon transitions.
Extended SSL to EFSM
The algorithm for creating an EFSM is divided into four steps.
1. Build the set of variables from the variable section of the specification.
2. Build a mapping between the alias names and what they are aliases
for.
3. Translate the sequence specification into an finite statemachine (FSM).
4. Create an EFSM by associating the set of variables with the generated
FSM. Replace all occurrences of aliases.
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Steps 1, 2 and 4 of the algorithm are trivial and we will not discuss them.
The third step of the algorithm is more involved so we give a more detailed
explanation of how it works.
All regular expressions can be translated into non-deterministic finite state
automata. Our algorithm follows the structure of a proof for this property
given by Hopcroft, Motwani and Ullman [22]. The translation algorithm
works by recursively creating one FSM for each sub-sequence. The gen-
erated FSMs are then connected by adding epsilon transitions. How the
epsilon transitions are added depends on which composition operator is
used: concatenation, union or closure. Figure 7.2 shows how the FSMs are
connected depending on the operator used. They are the same as shown in
[22] with some small modifications to fit better with our algorithm.
The algorithm is shown in Figure 7.3. The algorithm is implemented using
a recursive function interpretSequence and assumes that the sequence is
a valid sequence. The function takes one argument which is the sequence
that should be interpreted. Initially the function gets called with the whole
sequence specification as argument.
On lines 2-4 the algorithm is initialized by creating a new empty finite state
machine, an empty list of sub-machines and reading the next symbol in the
sequence. On line 6 we start a loop that reads symbols either until there
are no more symbols left or we reach ’]’ symbols. When the ’]’ symbols is
reached the current sub-sequence is done. On line 7 we have the start of
a sub-sequence and therefore recursively call the interpretSequence func-
tion. As shown in the algorithm a new state is created for each ’:’ symbol.
When a new state is added we must check if we must add transitions for
concatenation, closure or union. How the transitions are added is shown
in Figure 7.2. The transitions are added in lines 16-21. When we add trans-
itions for concatenation, closure or union we reset the list of sub-machines
to an empty list. On line 23 we add a new transition to the current state
with the current message as label if we didn’t have any sub-machines. On
line 29 we return the generated machine for the sequence.
From an EFSM to Epsilon Free EFSM
The algorithm for translating an EFSMM into an equivalent EFSMNwithout
epsilon transitions is based on a definition for translating an NFSA with
epsilon transitions to an equivalent DFSA. This definition can be found in
[22]. A difference between their definition and our algorithm is that the
EFSM N is not necessarily deterministic.
To explain the algorithm we need some new terms. The epsilon closure of a
state s is the set of all states that can be reached from s using only epsilon
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epsilon epsilon
Sequence form: ... : [ ... ] : ...
The last state before
the sub-machine
The first state after
the sub-machine
The sub-machine
Initial state
of the sub-machine
End state of the 
sub-machine
(a)
epsilon epsilon
epsilon
epsilon
Sequence form: ... : [ ... ]* : ...
(b)
epsilon
epsilon
epsilon
epsilon
epsilon
epsilon
Sequence form: ... : [ ... ] | ... | [ ... ] : ...
(c)
Figure 7.2: Three figures showing how transitions are added. (a) shows the
transitions for the concatenation operation, (b) shows the transitions for the
closure operator and (c) shows the transitions for the union operator.
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1 def interpretSequence ( sequence ):
fsm = <new empty finite state machine >
submachines = <empty list >
nextSymbol = <next symbol from sequence >
5 currState = None
while <nextSymbol not empty> and nextSymbol != "]":
i f nextSymbol == "[":
submachine = interpretSequence ( sequence )
10 submachines .add( submachine )
e l i f nextSymbol == "*":
<closure >
e l i f nextSymbol == "|":
<union>
15 e l i f nextSymbol == ":":
newState = <new state>
i f <closure >:
<add closure >
e l i f <union>:
20 <add union>
e l i f <concatenation >:
<add concatenation >
e l s e :
<add transition from currState to newState >
25 currState = newState
e l s e :
currentMessage = nextSymbol
nextSymbol = <next symbol from sequence >
30 re tu rn fsm
Figure 7.3: Recursive algorithm for converting a SSL sequence specification
into an finite state machine.
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1 def epsilonFree ( m, n, state ):
i f <n contains state>:
re tu rn
5
<add state to n>
fo r transition in state. transitions :
toState = <get to state of the transition from m>
10 eClosure = <epsilon -closure of toState >
compoundState = <create compound state from eClosure >
epsilonFree ( m, n, compoundState )
Figure 7.4: A depth-first algorithm for creating an epsilon-free EFSM.
transitions. A compound state is a state made of a set of other states. A
compound state has all the transitions of all the states in the set.
The algorithm is shown in Figure 7.4. The algorithm uses a depth-first
search strategy that computes the epsilon closure for each reachable state.
The epsilon closure is used to generate a compound state which is then
used in the next step of the algorithm. The algorithm takes three argu-
ments. The argument m is the old EFSM M, n is the new epsilon-free EFSM
and state is the state that is currently being investigated. Initially state
is a compound state generated from the initial state of m. The algorithm
avoids going into an infinite loop on line 3 where it checks if a state is
already in n, if so it returns immediately.
Deterministic EFSM
Our algorithm does not generate a deterministic EFSM, though the defini-
tion in [22] that the algorithm is based on does produce a deterministic FSA.
The reason that the epsilon free EFSM is not deterministic is that the defin-
ition in [22] applies to FSA and our algorithm applies to EFSM. A normal
FSM does not have preconditions on the labels and that makes an import-
ant difference. An EFSMwithout preconditionsmight be non-deterministic
while an EFSMwith preconditions can be deterministic if the preconditions
mutually excludes the transitions that make the EFSM non-deterministic.
We have not looked at how we can check if an EFSM is deterministic or
not.
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7.4 Monitor
TheMonitor is responsible for intercepting all method calls and method re-
turns to and from the component. Themethod calls andmethod returns are
modeled as messages. The Monitor should intercept the messages trans-
parently for both the component and its clients.
7.4.1 Transparency
That the monitoring should be transparent means that the fact that a com-
ponent is being monitored is hidden both from the component and its cli-
ents. In practice this means that there should be no code in the component
or its clients that takes the monitoring into account. Since there is no mon-
itoring code in neither the component nor its clients we must retrofit the
monitoring at a later stage than when the component and its clients were
being coded. We can retrofit the program either at the source code level,
the byte code level or the interpreter level. We have chosen to do it at the
byte code level as there are several tools that support changing the Java
byte code and it removes the possibility of someone mistaking the changed
program for the original program. Changing the byte code is also simpler
than changing the interpreter or in Java’s case: the JVM.
As mentioned there are several different tools for changing Java byte code.
We have chosen to use AspectJ because of its relative simplicity, maturity
and documentation.
7.4.2 AspectJ and Aspect Oriented Programming
Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) is a new technology focused on how to
achieve better separation of concerns. A program has several areas of in-
terest or focuses and we refer to these interests and focuses as concerns. The
concerns of a program are often synonymous with the program’s features.
When we design a program we try to separate all the concerns into single
entities like classes or methods to achieve better modularity. However, not
all concerns can be neatly encapsulated in classes and methods, they cut
across several classes or methods at once. These concerns are called cross-
cutting concerns. The purpose of AOP is to provides additional mechanisms
that make it possible to address cross-cutting concerns. Examples of cross-
cutting concerns are logging, security, caching and in our case monitoring
of method calls.
AOP languages use five main elements for dealing with cross-cutting con-
cerns: “a join point model describing the ’hooks’ where enhancement may
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be added; a means of identifying join points; a means of specifying be-
haviour at join points; encapsulated units combining join point specifica-
tion and behaviour enhancements; and a method of attachment of units to
a program” [33]. Several different frameworks for doing aspect oriented
programming have been created. We will now take closer look at AspectJ,
which is a framework for doing AOP in Java.
In AspectJ a join point is a well-defined point in the execution flow of the
program [17]. For instance the call of a method and the setting of an object
field are both join points. A program contains a large number of join points
and we need some way to systematically identify the join points that are
of interest. In AspectJ we use pointcuts to identify the sets of join points
that are of interest. AspectJ uses several different kinds of pointcuts to let
the selection of join points be as flexible as possible. For instance the call
pointcut and execution pointcut are used to select join points that are re-
lated to method calls, the set pointcut and get pointcuts are used to select
join points that are related to the setting and getting of object fields and
the within pointcut is used to select join points within a set of classes. The
pointcuts can also be combined using the ’!’, ’&&’ and ’||’ operators that
are equivalent to the set complement, set intersection and set union oper-
ators, respectively . A complete list of the different pointcut types can be
found in [18].
To alter the behaviour at the join points selected by a pointcut we use an
advice. An advice is connected to a pointcut and alters the behaviour at the
selected join points. There are three different types of advice: before advice,
after advice and around advice. The before advice and after advice are
executed before and after the join point, respectively. The around advice is
executed instead of the join point, but inside the around advice it is possible
to let the join point be executed by using the keyword proceed.
To tie together the pointcuts and advices we have the aspect. An aspect
can contain variables and is in that way similar to a class, but it is not
introduced into the program in the same way. While objects are created
explicitly by the programmer, the aspects are created automatically by the
runtime system. AspectJ offers some control over how the aspects are in-
stantiated. By default only one aspect is created for the entire system, but
there are options for creating one aspect per object of a set of classes and
for creating one aspect for each control flow in a set of control flows [18].
To connect the aspects and the associated program, a program called a
weaver is used to weave together the associated program with the aspects
by inserting the advices at the specified join points.
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1 aspect AOPExample {
pointcut getMother () : get(String Person.mother);
5 pointcut stringMethod (String arg):
call ( publ ic * Person .*( String ) ) && args (arg);
before () : getMother (){
10 System.out.println ("before␣getting ␣value␣of␣mother");
}
after() : getMother (){
System.out.println ("after␣getting ␣value␣of␣mother");
15 }
Object around( String arg ) : stringMethod ( arg ){
arg = arg.toUpperCase ();
re tu rn proceed( arg );
20 }
}
Figure 7.5: A simple AOP example using AspectJ syntax.
An AOP Example
A simple AOP example is show in Figure 7.5. The example is written using
AspectJ syntax and assumes that there exists a class Person with a variable
mother.
On line 3 we create a pointcut that selects all the join points that read
the value of the mother variable in a Person object. On lines 5-6 we cre-
ate a pointcut that selects all the calls to a method in a class Person that
takes one String argument. The pointcut also captures the argument value.
On lines 9-11 we define a before advice for the getMother pointcut we
defined before. On lines 13-15 we define an after advice for the getMother
pointcut. And on lines 17-20 we define an around advice for the string-
Method pointcut. This advice changes the argument String value to all
uppercase letters before it lets the method proceed.
Using AOP for Monitoring
The monitoring of method calls is a cross-cutting concern since the monit-
oring concern is spread over all monitored methods. We want to use As-
pectJ to address this cross-cutting concern in a way that is transparent to
the original program. We do so by first creating an aspect that will do all
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the monitoring and then we use the weaver to introduce the aspect into the
monitored program. This process is transparent to the original program.
7.4.3 Call Pointcuts vs. Execution Pointcuts
We will use AspectJ to monitor the method calls made to a component.
From AspectJ’s point of view there are two interesting join points associ-
ated with method calls. One is the join point where the call is made and
the other is when the method starts execution. AspectJ exposes these two
different types of join points through the call pointcut and the execution
pointcut.
The call pointcut selects the join point of the method call and the execution
pointcut selects the join point of the methods execution. At the surface
these two join points seem almost identical, but there are small and subtle
differences. The most important difference in our context is how the two
different types of join points are related to Java synchronization. In Java a
method can be declared to be synchronized. A synchronized method can
only be executed by a thread if no other thread executes a synchronized
method on the same object at the same time. The synchronization is taken
care of behind the scenes by the JVM using a lock for each object, freeing
the programmer from having to deal with the synchronization.
The difference between the join points selected by the call pointcut and
the execution pointcut is that the selected join points are before and after
the synchronization, respectively. This is important since if using the call
pointcut we can end up validating the wrong message sequence!
For instance three clients A, B and C communicate with the synchronized
component D. First A calls a method in D and since none of the other clients
holds the synchronization lock, A is given access. Then B calls a method in
D, but B must wait because the synchronization lock is taken. Then C calls
a method in D and C must also wait for the lock. Then client A finishes
and frees the lock. We now have no guarantee that B will be given access
first. So if C is given access first and we recorded the message at call time
we get a mismatch between the message sequence seen from the validation
point of view and the message sequence seen from the component’s point
of view. To avoid this possible error we use the execution pointcut.
A similar error might arise if a component is not synchronized using Java’s
built-in synchronization mechanism, but with custom made locking mech-
anisms. This problem can not be solved using the execution pointcut. For
reasons of simplicity we will ignore this problem and assume that all com-
ponents use the built-in synchronizationmechanism if it requires synchron-
ization.
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7.4.4 Around Advice vs. Before and After Advice
We have two choices for how we should associate the monitoring with the
selected join points. We can either use the around advice or we can use a
combination of the before advice and the after advice. We have chosen to
use the around advice since the around advice makes it possible to change
the actual method call to a completely different method call. Changing
the method call is not possible using the other approach since there is no
possibility of not letting the original method execute. The around advice
also makes it easy to change the return value of a method call.
7.4.5 Mutual Exclusive Validation
To avoid any race conditions related to more than one message being val-
idated at the same time, we want the validation of each message to be mu-
tually exclusive. We achieve mutual exclusion by using locks that prevent
concurrent access to the validation code. We have chosen to use fair locks to
avoid the possibility that the monitoring could lead to starvation for some
of the clients.
Mutual exclusion of validation is already achieved if we use the execution
pointcut and only monitor synchronized methods. The mutual exclusion
is guaranteed since the validation only happens between the time the syn-
chronization lock is taken and when it is released. We do not want to limit
ourselves to only monitoring synchronized methods so we must provide
an additional locking scheme for the validation. The actual implemented
locking scheme is shown in Section 7.5.
7.4.6 Threads as Clients
We must now define clearly what the framework views as clients before
we can do validation for more then one client. One possibility is to use
objects as clients and the other possibility is to use threads as clients. Ob-
jects as clients is a quite natural definition since we also have objects as
components. The use of objects as clients is however not possible when
using AspectJ and the execution pointcut for monitoring. The execution
pointcut selects the join points in the context of the executing method and
in this context no reference to the calling object is available. This makes it
impossible to identify the client. A different problem with objects as clients
is that Java does not offer access to unique object identifiers. The closest to
a unique identifier is the Object.hashCode() method, but that method is
implementation specific [30].
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To avoid these problems we will use threads as clients. The identifier of
the thread is unique while the thread is running and available at any join
point. A thread identifier can however be reused after the thread has fin-
ished. We disregard the possibility that a thread identifier can be reused
since it is highly unlikely. The thread identifier is of type long meaning
a 64 bit numeric value, giving 264 possible different values. In Sun’s im-
plementation of the Java API the thread identifiers are used in sequential
order [31], so for a thread identifier to be reused requires that 264 threads
are created during the programs life time.
7.5 Monitor Generator
TheMonitor Generator is implemented in Python. It reads the specification
and from the specification it determines what methods should be mon-
itored. The monitor generator is not strictly necessary since it is possible
to implement a general monitor that can monitor any program. A general
monitor would however be required to monitor all methods since it can’t
know beforehand what methods are of interest to the framework. Monitor-
ing method calls takes time and monitoring all method calls would result
in a unnecessarily large runtime overhead without adding anything to the
framework. We have therefore created a Monitor Generator that generates
the monitors specifically for each specification.
The generated monitors are created using AspectJ syntax. They have one
pointcut definition for eachmethod and one around advice for each pointcut.
We show an example of a generated monitor in Figure 7.6. In the example
we declare a monitor aspect that monitors one method in the class Test in
the package examples. In the example we have removed the declaration
of variables and the constructor declaration. On line 1 we declare an as-
pect and use the perthis keyword to specify that one monitor should be
created for each Test object. On line 3 we define a pointcut that selects all
the join points within the scope of the class Test. On line 5 we define a
pointcut that selects the execution join points of the method test() in the
class Test. On lines 7-27 we declare the around advice and associate it with
the pointcut that selects the method executions. In the advice a message is
validated before and after the executions of themethod. To ensure that only
one message is validated at one time for unsynchronized methods we use
a lock. The lock must be taken before a message is validated and the lock is
releasedwhen the validation is complete. To ensure that the lock is released
in the case of exceptions we use the try{...}finally{...} clause. On line
22 we also add the possibility of altering the return message argument.
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1 publ ic aspect TestMonitorAspect perthis (inMonitoredClass ()){
pointcut inMonitoredClass ():within( examples .Test );
5 pointcut exec_test ():execution (* examples .Test .test (..) );
Object around(): exec_isLoggedIn () && inMonitoredClass (){
monitorLock .lock ();
10 Object returnValue ;
t r y {
<verify message >
15 } f i n a l l y { monitorLock .unlock (); }
returnValue = proceed ();
monitorLock .lock ();
20 t r y {
<verify message >
<change re tu rn value i f appropriate >
} f i n a l l y { monitorLock .unlock (); }
25
re tu rn returnValue ;
}
}
Figure 7.6: An example of a generated Monitor.
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7.6 Verifier
The responsibility of the Verifier is to validate that the message sequences
satisfy the specification. The actual validation of amessage sequence is per-
formed either by an extended finite state automaton or an extended finite
state machine. The Verifier is also responsible for handling all the errors
that are not handled by the specification. We have split the Verifier into
two different parts: the validation part and the error handling part.
To get a flexible design we have tried to reduce the coupling between the
Monitor and the Verifier and between the validation part of the Verifier and
the error handling part of the Verifier. By reducing the coupling we get a
systemwhere it is possible to change the different parts independently.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 we can reduce the dependencies by restricting
the communication between the different parts. In the Verifier implement-
ation we restrict the communication by letting all communication between
the different parts occur through interfaces. These interfaces are also as
restricted as possible.
The connection between the Monitor and the Verifier is achieved by the
Verifier interface that all Verifiers must implement. The Monitor is only
aware of the Verifier interface and does not know anything about the actual
Verifier implementation. The Verifier has no reference to the Monitor and
therefore it is independent of the Monitor implementation.
It is the error handling part of the Verifier that implements the Verifier inter-
face. The error handling part sends messages to the validation part, but the
validation part has no reference to the error handling part. This means that
the error handling part can be changed without any effect on the validation
part.
The class structure of the most important classes is shown in Figure 7.7. For
completeness we have included the Monitor as well.
7.6.1 The Error Handling Part
All error handling parts must implement the Verifier interface. The inter-
face has one method,
Message newMessage( Message message )
The method takes one argument which is the new message to be validated.
It returns the output from the specification automaton or machine. This
output can then be used by the Monitor to change the message without the
knowledge of the component and its clients.
88 CHAPTER 7. A PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION...
HaltingVerifier
#automaton: Automaton
+newMessage(message:Message): Message
Automaton
+performTransitions(input:Message): Message
EFSM
+performTransitions(input:Message): Message
EFSM
+performTransitions(input:Message): Message
ExceptionVerifier
#automaton: Automaton
+newMessage(message:Message): Message
Monitor
#verifier: Verifier
<<interface>> Verifier
+newMessage(message:Message): Message
Figure 7.7: UML diagram showing the class structure of the Verifier.
Each implementation of the error handling part is expected to provide an
error handling strategy for all errors that are not handled by the specifica-
tion. In the class diagram in Figure 7.7 we show two such implementations:
the HaltingVerifier and the ExceptionVerifier. The HaltingVerifier
handles the errors by halting the program and printing the offending mes-
sage sequence. The ExceptionVerifier does not halt, but instead throws
an exception. The HaltingVerifier and the ExceptionVerifier imple-
ment the Termination and Casting an exception strategy from Chapter 6 re-
spectively. We have only implemented these two error handling strategies
for the errors that are not handled by the specification.
Storing the Message Sequence
Both the HaltingVerifier and the ExceptionVerifier can give informa-
tion about the violating message sequence to the user. By giving this in-
formation to the user it will be easier for the user to find the cause of the
specification violation. We can divide the amount of information that the
Verifier provides into three levels.
No sequence This is the simplest level to implement and it provides the
least amount of information. The Verifier only gives information on
the current state of the specification automaton or specification ma-
chine.
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Bounded sequence At this level the Verifier stores parts of the message
sequence in memory using a FIFO list. When the list is full the oldest
message is removed before a new message is put in the list.
Full sequence At this level the Verifier stores the entire message sequence.
Storing the entire message sequence in memory gives a too large
overhead, so the list must be stored on disk. Since disk I/O is slow
compared to CPU operations, each message cannot lead to a disk op-
eration. Instead part of the message is kept in memory and at certain
intervals the list is flushed to disk.
Though keeping the whole list of message can seem useful, it has the pos-
sibility of providing too much information to the user. It is not practical
for a human to read a list of millions of message. For the entire message
sequence to be useful we need to use automated tools that can help us ana-
lyze the message sequence. Looking at such tools are outside the scope of
this thesis and we therefore only implemented the bounded sequence and
let the length of the bounded sequence be configurable by the user.
7.6.2 The Validation Part
The validation part of the Verifier is implemented using either an EFSA or
an EFSM. The EFSA can be used instead of the EFSM if the use of output
messages are not of interest. Both the EFSA and the EFSM implementation
are sub classes of the abstract base class Automaton. The Automaton class
has one public method which is the only method accessible to the error
handling part of the Verifier. The method
Message performTransitions( Message input )
takes a message as input and produces another message as output. The
EFSA implementations will return the input as output as long as it does
not halt. The EFSM can return a different output then input as discussed
in Chapter 6. Both the EFSA and EFSM return null if they can not perform
any transitions.
Both the EFSA and the EFSM implementations assume that the specifica-
tion is deterministic. In the cases where the specification is not determin-
istic the implementation assumes that this is an error and exits immediately.
As mentioned in Section 7.3.1, the translation algorithm of this thesis does
not always result in a deterministic EFSM, and a detailed study of if and
how a deterministic EFSMmay be generated from SSL specifications is out-
side the scope of this thesis.
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7.7 Summary
This chapter has given a detailed explanation of a prototype implementa-
tion of the runtime verification framework described in the previous chapters.
An overview of the implementation and how the various parts of the im-
plementation relate to each other was given. Then each of the main parts
of the implementation was discussed in detail.
Chapter 8
Examples
In this chapter we will present two example components and show how
we can specify the protocol of the components using SSL. We will also im-
plement the two components and use the the framework implementation
that we describedChapter 7 to validate that the implementations satisfy the
specification. The implementation of the example components are not part
of actual programs; they are just implemented for the purpose of testing
the framework.
The first part of this chapter presents the two examples and gives the SSL
specification for both of the examples. The second part looks at some
benchmarks for the framework, before we end the chapter with an eval-
uation of how well the framework worked for the examples.
8.1 The User Manager
In many applications it is vital that the users are authenticated before they
are given access to the application. This is most commonly done by asking
the user for a username and a password. The User Manager is a compon-
ent that performs the authentication process in web applications. It is also
responsible for keeping track of active users.
Web applications are quite different from normal desktop applications since
they run on top of the HTTP protocol. The HTTP protocol is stateless, so
each request from the user to the web application is independent of any
previous requests. To ensure that the application is not stateless, state in-
formation for each user is stored at the server side and each user is identi-
fied by a unique session identifier. The User Manager lets users authentic-
ate themselves using a username and password, and if the username and
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password are valid the User Manager issues a unique session identifier to
the user.
A session identifier can only be used for one session and after the users end
the session (i.e. logs out), the session identifiers are permanently disabled.
This prevents a session identifier from being intercepted by an unauthor-
ized user and used at a later time to gain access to the application.
8.1.1 Operations
The User Manager supports the following operations:
Login This operation attempts to login in the user. The user must provide
both a username and password. If the username and password are
valid, the operation returns a valid session identifier. If either the
username or the password is invalid, the operation returns null.
If a user who is already logged in attempts to login again, the user is
not given a new session identifier, but the same as it received the last
time. In other words each user is only allowed to have one session at
the time.
Logout This operation attempts to logout a user identified by a session
identifier. The effect of the logout is that the session identifier be-
comes invalid. If the operation was successful it returns the session
identifier that just became invalid, otherwise it returns null.
Change Password This operation attempts to change the password for the
user. This operation fails if the user is not logged in, the supplied old
password is wrong or the supplied new password does not meet the
password requirements. If the operation is successful it returns true,
otherwise it returns false.
Check Validity This operation is offered to the other components so that
they can check the validity of session identifiers. The operation re-
turns true if a session identifier is valid and it returns false the ses-
sion identifier is not valid.
8.1.2 Implementation
We implement the User Manager using a class UserManager. Each of the
User Manager’s supported operations is implemented as one method. The
skeleton for a Java implementation of the User Manager is shown in Figure
8.1.
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1 publ ic c l a s s UserManager {
publ ic SessionID login(String username ,String password ){}
5 publ ic SessionID logout(SessionID sessionID ){}
publ ic boolean isActive (SessionID sessionID ){}
publ ic boolean changePassword ( SessionID sessionID ,
10 String oldPassword ,
String newPassword ){}
}
Figure 8.1: Skeleton for a Java implementation of the User Manager
Since it is likely that the User Manager will be accessed by several threads
at once we must ensure mutual exclusion to critical regions. Mutually ex-
clusive access is achieved by declaring all the methods in the UserManager
class as synchronized.
8.1.3 SSL Specification
We have created an SSL specification for the User Manager. The specifica-
tion is shown in Figure 8.2.
The specification defines several variables. The variables $true, $false
and $null are used in expressions to represent the values true, false and
null respectively. The variable $users holds the usernames of all known
users, the variable $activeIDs holds all the active session identifiers and
the variable $usedIDs holds all the used session identifiers. The sequence
specification reflects that the communication with the clients is stateless
and therefore on the form of a single call and a single return. The specific-
ation uses the error handling we discussed in Chapter 6 and changes the
session identifier to null if an unknown client is given a session identifier.
8.2 Query
Many applications communicate with a database. The database might be
on a remote machine and it can be accessed by several applications at the
same time. It can therefore take some time to access the database. To reduce
the time it takes to perform some types of queries we can use an interme-
diate component between the application and the database, we call this the
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1 // variables
shared Set $users = { Client1,Client3,Client5,Client54 }
shared Set $activeIDs = {}
shared Set $usedIDs = {}
5 shared S t r ing $true = true
shared S t r ing $false = false
shared S t r ing $null = null
// aliases
a l i a s loginKnown = login(# user, #pass ); check #user in $users
10 a l i a s validLogin = re tu rn login(# sID);
check (not (# sID in $activeIDs )) and
(not (# sID equals $null));
do #sID add−to $activeIDs
a l i a s loginUnknown = login(# user, #pass );
15 check not (# user in $users)
a l i a s invalidLogin = re tu rn login(# sID);
check #sID equals $null
a l i a s loginError = re tu rn login(# sID);
check not (# sID equals $null);
20 output re tu rn login(null )
a l i a s logoutActive = logout (# sID); check #sID in $activeIDs
a l i a s validLogout = re tu rn logout(# sID);
do #sID remove−from $activeIDs, #sID add−to $usedIDs
a l i a s logoutInactive = logout (# sID);
25 check not (# sID in $activeIDs )
a l i a s invalidLogout = re tu rn logout (#sID);
check #sID equals $null
a l i a s changePasswordActive = changePassword (# sID, #old,#new);
check #sID in $activeIDs
30 a l i a s changePasswordInactive =changePassword (# sID, #old, #new);
check not (# sID in $activeIDs )
a l i a s changePasswordValid = re tu rn changePassword (# retVal);
check #retVal equals $true
a l i a s changePasswordInvalid = re tu rn changePassword (# retVal);
35 check #retVal equals $false
a l i a s isActiveActive = isActive (# sID); check #sID in $activeIDs
a l i a s isActiveInactive = isActive (# sID);
check not (# sID in $activeIDs )
a l i a s isActiveTrue = re tu rn isActive (# retVal);
40 check #retVal equals $true
a l i a s isActiveFalse = re tu rn isActive (# retVal);
check #retVal equals $false
// sequence
:[:
45 [: loginKnown :[: validLogin :]|[: invalidLogin :]: ]|
[: loginUnknown :[: invalidLogin :]|[: loginError :]: ]|
[: changePasswordActive :
[: changePasswordValid :]|
[: changePasswordInvalid :]
50 :]|
[: changePasswordInactive : changePasswordInvalid :]|
[: isActiveActive : isActiveTrue :]|
[: isActiveInactive : isActiveFalse :]|
[: logoutActive : validLogout :]|
55 [: logoutInactive : invalidLogout :]
:]*:
Figure 8.2: SSL specification for the UserManager class.
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Figure 8.3: A conceptual view of the Query component.
Query component. Figure 8.3 shows a conceptual view of the Query com-
ponent. The Query component has access to the database and all queries
to the database go through the Query component. To speed up some types
of queries, the Query component stores the result of the last query for each
of its clients. This stored result can then be manipulated to get the desired
view of the result. For instance by sorting the results. Since the Query com-
ponent can avoid making some of the queries to the database, the response
time is reduced and so it the load on the database. The decreased load on
the database can again lead to faster response times when the Query com-
ponent must query the database.
The Query component only works with relational databases.
8.2.1 Operations
The Query component supports the following operations.
Init The Init operation attempts to make a connection to the database. It is
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the first operation that must be called for each client and no other op-
erations are accepted until the Init operation is successful. The reason
that the Init operation must be called for each client is that a client
does not know if any of the other clients have already performed
the Init operation. The operation returns a unique client identifier
if a connection is established or already has been established with the
database. The operation returns null otherwise.
New Query The New Query operation tries to query the base. The spe-
cific query is supplied by the client. The operation fails if the client
identifier is not the one supplied by the Init operation or if the query
that is supplied by the client is invalid. If the operation is successful
it returns true, otherwise it returns false. If the query is successful
the result is stored by the Query component.
Get Result The Get Result operation can only be performed after a suc-
cessful New Query operation. The operation fails if the wrong client
identifier is supplied. The operation returns a Result object if it is
successful, otherwise it returns null.
Sort The Sort operation can only be performed after a successful New
Query operation. The operation sorts the current result and stores
the newly sorted result. A list of columns is supplied by the client
to determine how the result should be sorted. The operation fails if
either the wrong client identifier is supplied or the list of columns
does not match the columns in the result. The operation returns a
Result object if it is successful, otherwise it returns null.
Match The Match operation removes all rows in a result that do not match
a supplied expression. The operation stores the new result. The oper-
ation fails if either the wrong client identifier is supplied or the sup-
plied expression is invalid. The operation returns a Result object if it
is successful, otherwise it returns null.
Reset The Reset operation resets the current result so that the effect of
any Sort or Match operations are removed. The operation fails if the
wrong client identifier is supplied. The operation returns true if it is
successful, otherwise it returns false.
Remove Query This Remove Query operation deletes a query from the
Query component. It is the last operation that is called before a new
query is made. The operation must be successful before a new query
can be made. The operation returns true if the right client identifier
is supplied and the query is successfully removed. It returns false
otherwise.
8.3. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK 97
1 publ ic c l a s s Query{
publ ic String init (){}
5 publ ic boolean newQuery (String clientID ,String query){}
publ ic boolean reset(String clientID ){}
publ ic boolean removeQuery (String clientID ){}
10
publ ic Result getResult (String clientID ){}
publ ic Result sort (String clientID ,String [] columns){}
15 publ ic Result match(String clientID ,String expression ){}
}
Figure 8.4: A skeleton of the Java implementation of the Query component.
8.2.2 Implementation
We implement the Query component using a class Query. Each of the op-
erations supported by the Query component is implemented as a method.
The skeleton for a Java implementation of the Query component is shown
in Figure 8.4. Note that the methods are not declared to be synchronized,
so the implementation must use other means to ensure that the any critical
sections are mutually excluded.
8.2.3 SSL Specification
We have specified the communication protocol for the Query component
using SSL. The specification is shown in Figure 8.5.
The specification uses five variables. The variables $true, $false and $null
are used in expressions to represent the values true, false and null respect-
ively. The variable $id is used to hold the client identifier returned by the
Init operation. The variable $ids is used to hold all the client identifiers
that have been returned by the Init operation. When a new client identifier
is returned, it is checked that it has not been used before.
8.3 Testing the Framework
The possibility of specifying the protocol of a component and validate that
the communication between the component and its clients satisfies the pro-
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1 // variables
shared Set $ids = {}
ex c lu s i v e S t r ing $id = null
shared S t r ing $false = false
5 shared S t r ing $true = true
shared S t r ing $null = null
// aliases
a l i a s okInit = re tu rn init (# ret);
check (not (# ret equals $null)) and (not (# ret in $ids));
10 do #ret assign− to $id, #ret add−to $ids
a l i a s badInit = re tu rn init (# ret); check #ret equals $null
a l i a s newQuery = newQuery (# id, #query);
a l i a s okQuery = re tu rn newQuery (# ret); check #ret equals $true
a l i a s badQuery = re tu rn newQuery (# ret);
15 check #ret equals $false
a l i a s removeRight = removeQuery (#id); check #id equals $id
a l i a s removeWrong = removeQuery (#id); check not (#id equals $id)
a l i a s okRemove = re tu rn removeQuery (#ret);
check #ret equals $true
20 a l i a s badRemove = re tu rn removeQuery (#ret);
check #ret equals $false
a l i a s sortRight = sort (# id, #arg2 ); check #id equals $id
a l i a s sortWrong = sort (# id, #arg2 ); check not (#id equals $id)
a l i a s sortValid = re tu rn sort (# ret);
25 check not (# ret equals $null)
a l i a s sortInvalid = re tu rn sort (# ret); check #ret equals ←֓
→֒$null
a l i a s matchRight = match(# id, #arg2 ); check #id equals $id
a l i a s matchWrong = match(# id, #arg2 ); check not (#id equals $id)
a l i a s matchValid = re tu rn match(# ret);
30 check not (# ret equals $null)
a l i a s matchInvalid = re tu rn match(# ret);
check #ret equals $null
a l i a s getResultRight = getResult (# id); check #id equals $id
a l i a s getResultWrong = getResult (# id);
35 check not (#id equals $id)
a l i a s getResultValid = re tu rn getResult (# ret);
check not (# ret equals $null)
a l i a s getResultInvalid = re tu rn getResult (# ret);
check #ret equals $null
40 a l i a s resetRight = reset(#id); check #id equals $id
a l i a s resetWrong = reset(#id); check not (#id equals $id)
a l i a s resetValid = re tu rn reset(# ret); check #ret equals $true
a l i a s resetInvalid = re tu rn reset(# ret);
check #ret equals $false
45 // sequence
:[: init () :[: badInit : init () :]*: okInit :
[: newQuery :[: badQuery : newQuery :]*: okQuery :
[: [: sortRight : sortValid :] |
[: sortWrong : sortInvalid :] |
50 [: matchRight : matchValid :] |
[: matchWrong : matchInvalid :] |
[: getResultRight : getResultValid :] |
[: getResultWrong : getResultInvalid :] |
[: resetRight : resetValid :] |
55 [: resetWrong : resetInvalid :] |
[: removeWrong : badRemove :]
:]* : removeRight : okRemove :]* :]:
Figure 8.5: SSL specification for the Query class.
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tocol, can be of great help in finding errors in a program. However if the
monitoring should be part of the program while it is in use, the monitoring
can not have a prohibitive effect on the performance of the program. To
get a better overview of the effect of monitoring, we have created a simple
benchmark. The purpose of the benchmark is to give an indication of how
the monitoring affects the performance of a program and how the monitor-
ing scales in applications with many threads. The benchmark was run on
the prototype implementation from Chapter 7
8.3.1 The Benchmark
The benchmark we use is based on the Unix time command. The time com-
mand is used to execute other programs and record a number of different
statistics about the running program. We will only use the user statistic
which basically records the time it would take a program to execute if no
other programs where using the CPU.
This benchmark is simple and gives consistent results when run on the
same program several times. It does not give detailed information on the
performance of the various parts of the program, but in our case that is not
important since we just want an overview of the effect of the monitoring.
We have run the benchmark on both of the examples presented in this
chapter. Each of the examples was run with and without monitoring. They
were also run using 1, 5, 10, 100 and 500 threads in both the monitored and
the unmonitored case. To ensure that one divergent result should not have
large impact on the final result the benchmark was run 50 times for each
case.
8.3.2 The Results
User Manager
The benchmark was run on the UserManager class both with and without
monitoring. The UserManager is implemented using synchronized meth-
ods and the methods perform almost no computations at all. The methods
are therefore very fast. To run the benchmark we created threads that acted
as clients by calling methods in the UserManager class. Each thread called
the same methods in the same order.
The results from the benchmarks are shown Figure 8.6. We can see in the
figure that the number of threads that are used and thereby also the num-
ber of methods that are executed has little effect on the performance when
monitoring is not used. When monitoring is not used, initialization of the
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JVM is the dominant factor when it comes to how much time it takes to
execute the benchmark.
When monitoring is turned on, we see a significant increase in time. From
a factor of 5 for 1 thread to a factor of 15 for 500 threads. The reason for
this increase in time is most likely lock contention, that is, multiple threads
competing to acquire the lock. Since the methods are fast, the validation
of the message sequence must be performed often and since one lock is
shared among all the threads, it becomes increasingly likely that a thread
must wait before it can acquire the lock.
Query
The benchmark was run on the Query class both with and without monit-
oring. The Query class does not use synchronized methods. To ensure that
the execution of each method takes some time, all methods perform heavy
mathematical calculations. For running the benchmark we have a number
of threads that acts as clients and calls methods in the Query class. Each
thread calls the same methods in the same order.
The results of the benchmarks are shown in Figure 8.7. As expected the
execution of the method calls dominates the time used by the benchmark
when the monitoring is not used. The increases in time is linear with the
number threads that are used and thereby the number of methods that are
called. When monitoring is used, we see that the amount of time increase
by a factor of 2 or 3. The factor increase is actually smaller when the number
of threads increase.
8.4 Evaluation
We have now looked at two examples and shown how we can use the SSL
to specify the protocols. We will now discuss some of our experiences from
the use of the framework on these examples.
8.4.1 Specification
Creating the specifications for the two examples worked for the most part
well, but some limitations where discovered.
• The current version of SSL only supports the variables types Set and
String. In the specification of the User Manager it could be practical
with a mapping type as well. This type could have been used in the
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Figure 8.6: The benchmark results for the UserManager class. (a) shows the
results for without monitoring (b) shows the results with monitoring.
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Figure 8.7: The benchmark results for the Query class. (a) shows the results
without monitoring and (b) shows the result with monitoring.
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User Manager specification to hold the mapping between user names
and passwords.
• When populating the variables with initial values it could be nice to
use functions to get the information from the monitored component.
For instance to get the set of valid users from the UserManager class.
• At some places it could be convenient to refer to the argument values
in the previous message.
• At some places the specification could not completely specify the be-
haviour of the component even when the behaviour could be com-
pletely determined by the input from the client. The reason for this
was the lack of more types in the type system.
8.4.2 Speed
As the benchmarks shows, the current implementation of the framework
has some performance problems when it comes to components that have
fast methods and that are access by a large number of threads. These prob-
lems are largely related to lock contention on the lock that ensures that the
validation is properly synchronized.
Lock contention arises when more than one thread wants to acquire the
same lock at the same time. Since only one thread can acquire the lock at
one time, all the other threads must wait for the lock to become free. The
more threads are waiting to acquire the lock, the more the average time to
wait for the lock will increase. Thus lock contention reduces the programs
performance. To reduce the lock contention and improve performance, we
can use a more sophisticated locking schemes.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter we have looked at two examples that illustrate how we can
use the presented framework to specify and validate components. We have
also looked at some benchmarks on the examples that show how the mon-
itoring affects the execution speed of the program. The chapter ended with
a short evaluation of our experience with the current framework.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Further Work
In this chapter we discuss the main contributions made by this thesis and
point out some possibilities for further work.
9.1 Contributions
In this thesis we have investigated an approach to history-based runtime
verification of protocol specifications; i.e., how to validate at runtime that
an implemented component satisfies its protocol specification. In order
to investigate this approach, we have developed a prototype validation
framework, in the setting of Java, as a proof of concept for the approach.
The prototype has been applied to the monitoring and validation of com-
ponents written in Java. We have investigated the following questions:
• Can the history of communication for a given component be recorded
in a way which is transparent to the program?
In the case of Java programs, the communication history of a compon-
ent can be transparently recorded by retrofitting the monitoring code
into the monitored program. There are several possible solutions to
how the monitor code can be retrofitted. We showed one possible
solution, where AspectJ was used to insert the monitoring code into
the byte code of the monitored program. This could be done without
any changes to the monitored program.
• Can we express history-based protocol specifications intuitively?
We have seen two intuitive ways of specifying history-based proto-
cols. One approach is to express the protocols as automata or state
machines. Using automata or state machines is quite low-level and a
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more high-level abstraction is need. We therefore introduced a high-
level abstraction of the automata-based approach. This high-level ab-
straction is based on regular expressions. Regular expressions are an
intuitive approach for specifying message sequences.
• Can history-basedprotocol specifications be applied to single-threaded
Java programs? Can they also be applied tomultithreaded programs?
It is possible to apply history-based protocol specifications to both
single-threaded and multithreaded programs. We presented an ap-
proach where a protocol is specified for the communication between
one component and one client, and then showed how we could auto-
matically expand the specifications to supportmultiple clients as nee-
ded at runtime. Although a component can have multiple clients
without being part of a multithreaded program, support for multiple
clients also gives support for multithreaded programs.
• Can we represent history-based protocol specifications effectively for
runtime validation?
By using automata or state machines to represent the protocol spe-
cifications we can effectively validate that a component’s communic-
ation history satisfies a specification, even for long lasting or non-
terminating executions with multiple clients. Several optimizations
for the automata representations are possible. These optimizations
reduce the number of states in the automata, and thereby also reduce
the time and memory overhead required for performing the valida-
tion.
• Can history-based protocol monitoring and validation be used for er-
ror correction at the protocol level?
Error correction can be supported at the protocol level by using the
runtime verification framework to manipulate messages that causes
violations on the protocol. In many cases, messages can be manipu-
lated transparently to the monitored program. We presented an ap-
proach that used state machines to specify protocols with error cor-
rection.
The main question of this thesis is
• Can runtime verification techniques support history-based specifica-
tion of protocols?
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Based on the answers above, we can affirmatively answer this question.
In this thesis we have investigated an approach to runtime verification
supporting history-based protocol specification. This approach does not
only support runtime validation of communication histories with respect
to protocol specifications, but also error handling at the protocol level by
manipulating the communication between a component and its clients. We
have developed an associated prototype for the validation of components
in multithreaded Java programs as a proof of concept for the ideas presen-
ted in this thesis.
9.2 Further Work
The framework that we have presented has many useful properties, but
there is room for several improvements. We list some possibilities for fur-
ther work below.
Expanding the Model with Sender and Receiver
The current specifications do not take into account the sender or the re-
ceiver of a message. For instance, this makes it impossible to support some
error handling strategies that depend on changing the receiver of amessage
or perhaps duplicate a message and sending it to several receivers.
One possibility for expanding the model may be to expand the labels on
the transitions with an identifier for the sender and an identifier for the
receiver. This solution would require that many of the definitions for auto-
mata and state machines used in this thesis would have to be changed.
Connecting Implementation and Specification
It can be interesting to investigate ways to connect the specification and
implementation of a component. In this thesis we have focused on the
specification being separated from the component, but there could be some
advantages in connecting the specification and the component. Connecting
a specification with a specified component can be especially useful when it
comes to error handling, and as a way to create the initial values of the
specification variables.
For instance, a component may provide error handling code that may be
called by the framework in case of specific types of errors.
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Integration into Other Frameworks
There exists several frameworks that do some variant of runtime verifica-
tion and it could be interesting to integrate the ideas presented in this thesis
into one of the other frameworks. It could be especially interesting to try
to integrate the ideas presented in this thesis into Java Modeling Language
(JML).
One interesting possibility is to see if it is possible to define the semantics
of JML specifications in a model based on communication histories.
Efficient Monitor Implementation
If a program should be monitored during normal operation it is import-
ant that the monitoring has a low impact on the overall performance of the
program. Current monitoring techniques have a too high impact on per-
formance if the monitoring is continuous and affects the entire program.
Finding an effective monitoring technique will not only have significant
impact on runtime verification approaches, but also other programs that
collect information about the runtime behaviour of a program. Examples
of such programs are profilers. Profilers are used to monitor a program’s
execution to get information about which parts of a program it is most im-
portant to optimize.
It is possible to research these issues either exclusively on the Java platform
or more generally to find fundamental techniques for efficient monitoring.
If restricting the research to the Java platform, a good starting point would
be to study the Java Virtual Machine specification [32] and some of the
available libraries for doing byte code engineering, e.g. BCEL1.
A Richer Type System
The current type system of our specification language has only two types:
String and Set. We saw in Chapter 8 that a richer types system may give
more expressive power. The type system in JML [11] could serve as a good
starting point for creating a richer type system.
Support For True Concurrency
The current framework supports multiple threads using an interleaving se-
mantics for message sending, however, support for true concurrency be-
comes increasingly important sincemanymodernCPUs havemultiple cores
1jakarta.apache.org/bcel/
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and can therefore execute several threads simultaneously. Any furtherwork
in this direction should try to discover if true concurrency can be suppor-
ted, what changes it requires to the underlying model and under what cir-
cumstances true concurrency becomes important.
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Appendix A
Compiling and Using the
Prototype Implementation
This appendix explains how to compile and use the prototype implement-
ation that was presented in Chapter 7. The implementation is available at
http://folk.uio.no/oysteto/master/code.tar.gz.
A.1 Requirements
To compile and use the prototype implementation the following third-party
tools are required:
Ant Ant is a build tool that is used to make it easier to compile the pro-
totype. The prototype has been tested with Ant version 1.6.5 and is
likely to work for slightly older releases as well. Ant is available at
http://ant.apache.org.
Java SDK To compile the and run the Java code, a Java compiler and Java
runtime environment is required. The compiler and runtime environ-
ment must support Java 5. The prototype has been tested with J2SE
5.0. J2SE 5.0 is available at http://java.sun.com.
AspectJ AspectJ is required to connect the Monitor with the monitored
component. The prototype requires the use of AspectJ 5. AspectJ
is available at http://www.eclipse.org/aspectj.
Python Python is required to run the specification parser, the monitor gen-
erator and various smaller utility scripts. The prototype was tested
with Python 2.3.5 and Python 2.4.2. Python is available at http:
//www.python.org.
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JUnit JUnit is required to run the unit tests for the Java code. The prototype
can be used without running the unit tests, they are only important
for testing purposes. The prototype has been tested with JUnit 3.8.1
and is likely to work with newer versions as well. JUnit is available
at http://www.junit.org.
A.1.1 Environment Variables
To successfully compile and run the prototype does not only require that
the tools are installed, but also that some elements are added to the envir-
onment variables. The following commands can be used on Linux to set
the appropriate environment variables. The directories will be the same on
other systems, but the commands may differ.
AspectJ
export AJ_DIR =[ install directory of AspectJ ]
export PATH =$PATH:$AJ_DIR /bin
export CLASSPATH =$CLASSPATH :$AJ_DIR/lib/aspectjweaver .jar
export CLASSPATH =$CLASSPATH :$AJ_DIR/lib/aspectjrt .jar
export CLASSPATH =$CLASSPATH :$AJ_DIR/lib/aspectjtools .jar
JUnit
export JUNIT_DIR =[ install directory of JUnit]
export CLASSPATH =$CLASSPATH :$JUNIT_DIR /junit.jar
A.2 Compiling the Prototype
It is easy to compile the prototype when all the tools have been installed.
The following command given at the command line when standing in the
prototype directory compiles all the necessary files:
ant buildAll
A.3 Running the Prototype
Using the prototype tomonitor and validate a component requires that sev-
eral commands are invoked. To simplify the process, the script enable-val-
idation.py performs all the required actions. The enable-validation.py
script requires that the class name of the monitored component is supplied
along with the file name of the specification file.
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enable -validation .py <class name of the monitored component >
<file name of the specification file >
For simplicity the script supports the use of either ’.’ or ’/’ when specifying
the class name of the monitored component.
When the enable-validation.py script has finished (this may take some
time since the AspectJ compiler is quite slow) the component will be mon-
itored and validated against the specification when it is used.
A.4 Example
We illustrate how to use the prototype on the Query example that was
discussed in Chapter 8. The Query component is implemented as a class
Query. This class and all related files are located in the examples/query/
directory in the prototype directory. The file name of the specification is
examples/query/Query.spec. To validate the Query component we type
the following command on the command line:
enable -validation .py examples /query/Query examples /query/←֓
→֒Query.spec
After the command has finished the component will be monitored. For
instance following command:
java examples .query.QueryRun 1 Client
gives the following output, showing that an error was found in the one of
the clients.
------------- ERROR -------------
The following message created an error in the sequence : ←֓
→֒newQuery ( null , dummy ) from Thread -0
--------- MESSAGE TRACE ---------
newQuery ( null , dummy ) from Thread -0
return init ( null ) from Thread -0
init ( ) from Thread -0
